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MULTIFACTOR BALANCING TEST 
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*
 
 
Authorship, and hence, initial ownership of copyrighted works is oftentimes 
controlled by the 1976 Copyright Act’s work made for hire doctrine.  This 
doctrine states that works created by employees within the scope of their 
employment result in the employer owning the copyright.  One key 
determination in this analysis is whether the hired party is an employee or 
independent contractor.  In 1989, the U.S. Supreme Court, in CCNV v. 
Reid, answered the question of how employees are distinguished from 
independent contractors by setting forth a list of factors courts should 
consider.   Unfortunately, the Supreme Court did not give further guidance 
on how to balance these factors.  Three years later, in 1992, the Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit decided Aymes v. Bonelli and noted that not 
all factors are equally weighted and that five of the factors would “be 
significant in virtually every situation.”  This analysis was supported by 
looking at all the work made for hire cases decided in the three year period 
since Reid – six cases in total.  This Article expands in both scope and time 
what the Second Circuit did in Aymes and systematically analyzes how 
courts have utilized the factors in the twenty-five years since Reid.  In 
particular, this study has identified the universe of cases where the courts 
have decided whether a hired party was an employee or independent 
contractor and uses the data from these cases to describe what factors 
appear to be the most and least important in reaching these conclusions.  
Based on the results of this study, this Article proposes a continuum of 
importance, which graphically illustrates the relative importance of each 
factor. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 Authorship plays a central role in copyright law.
1
  Conferring this 
title on people or entities bestows on them initial ownership of the 
copyright
2
 and the power to exploit the associated rights.
3
  Hence, it is no 
                                                          
1
 See U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“Congress shall have the power . . . to promote the 
progress of science and the useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and 
inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries.”) (emphasis 
added); see also Peter Jaszi, Toward a Theory of Copyright: The Metamorphoses of 
“Authorship,” 1991 DUKE L.J. 455, 455 (1991)(“‘authorship’ . . . is arguably the most 
central, and certainly the most resonant, of the foundational concepts associated with 
Anglo-American copyright doctrine.”). 
2
 17 U.S.C. § 201 (2012). 
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surprise that authorship is an oft-disputed issue between parties contesting 
the use of copyrighted works.
4
 
In many circumstances, determining authorship is easy because the 
general rule is that “the author is the party who actually creates the work [–] 
the person who translates an idea into a fixed, tangible expression.”5  The 
artist who paints a bowl of fruit in her home studio on the weekend to sell at 
a community art show is an easy example of the traditional notion of 
authorship.  The glaring exception to this general rule is the work made for 
hire doctrine.  In part, this doctrine provides that “a work prepared by an 
employee within the scope of his or her employment”6 is consequently 
owned by the employer.
7
  But the work made for hire doctrine does not 
simply change initial ownership of the copyright.
8
  This doctrine has found 
its way into several other issues, such as modifying the duration of the 
copyright,
9
 eliminating the right to terminate transfers of copyright,
10
 and 
prohibiting the acquisition of moral rights.
11
 
But unlike Hamlet, where the question was “to be, or not to be,”12 
for the work made for hire doctrine, the question is “employee or 
independent contractor?”  Distinguishing between employees and 
independent contractors under the 1976 Copyright Act’s work made for hire 
doctrine is an essential problem courts and parties need to resolve before 
                                                                                                                                                   
3
 Id. §§ 106, 106A (“[T]he owner of copyright under this title has the exclusive rights to do 
and to authorize any of the following: . . . .”) (“[T]he author of a work a work of visual art 
– shall have the right . . . .”). 
4
 See e.g. Latimer v. Roaring Toyz, Inc., 574 F. Supp. 2d 1265 (M.D. Fla. 2008), Numbers 
Licensing, LLC v. bVisual USA, Inc., 643 F. Supp. 2d 1245 (E.D. Wash. 2009), JustMed, 
Inc. v. Byce, 600 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2010), Martha Graham Sch. & Dance Found., Inc. v. 
Martha Graham Ctr. Of Contemporary Dance, Inc., 380 F.3d 624 (2nd Cir. 2004), Brower 
v. Martin, 446 F. Supp. 2d 232 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), Int’l Code Council, Inc. v. Nat’l Fire Prot. 
Ass’n, Inc., 79 U.S.P.Q.2d 1651 (N.D. Ill. 2006). 
5
 Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 737 (1989). 
6
 17 U.S.C. § 101 (definition of work made for hire). 
7
 Id. § 201(b). 
8
 Jon M. Garon & Elaine D. Ziff, The Work Made for Hire Doctrine Revisited: Startup and 
Technology Employees and the Use of Contracts in a Hiring Relationship, 12 MINN. J. L. 
SCI. & TECH. 489, 490 (2011). 
9
 Compare 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2012) (copyright generally persists  for the life of the 
author plus seventy years) with 17 U.S.C. § 302(c) (2012) (copyright in a work made for 
hire “endures for a term of 95 years from the year of its first publication, or a term of 120 
years from the year of its creation, whichever expires first.”). 
10
 Id. § 203(a) (“In the case of any work other than a work made for hire, the exclusive or 
nonexclusive grant of a transfer or license of copyright or of any right under a copyright . . 
. is subject to termination. . . .”); see also id. § 304(c), (d) (same exclusion, but applied to a 
different set of transfers). 
11
 See id. § 106A (granting moral rights “the author of a work of visual art”) and § 
101(2)(B) (definition of “work of visual art” as not including a work made for hire). 
12
 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET act III, sc. 1. 
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proceeding to analyze how ownership, duration, terminations of transfers, 
and moral rights are affected.
13
 
 Nearly twenty-five years ago, the U.S. Supreme Court attempted to 
give guidance to judges and parties involved in disputes over the 
employment status of hired individuals.
14
  In 1989, the Court issued its 
opinion in Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid
15
 and declared that 
distinguishing employees from independent contractors should be 
accomplished by using a multifactor balancing test.
16
  This test, which uses 
approximately a dozen factors, clarified what the proper test was, but 
spawned questions about how those factors are balanced and which factors, 
if any, are the most important in the analysis.
17
 
 Three years after Reid, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
decided Aymes v. Bonelli and noted that not all factors are equally 
weighted.
18
  The court in Aymes went further still and opined that five of the 
factors would “be significant in virtually every situation.”19  This analysis 
was supported by reviewing all the work made for hire cases decided in the 
three-year period since Reid – six cases in total.20 
 This Article greatly expands upon the Second Circuit’s work in 
Aymes.  It is the first study to comprehensively and systematically analyze 
the work made for hire factors and show their relative importance in 
distinguishing employees from independent contractors.  It contributes to 
the existing and highly-regarded literature of empirical studies analyzing 
multifactor tests.
21
  Using a data set consisting of the population of work 
made for hire cases decided since Reid where the courts determined the 
status of the hired party, this Article illustrates which factors are the most 
and least important in drawing this distinction.  These results confirm, in 
part, what the Second Circuit in Aymes believed – that a small subset of 
factors is important.
22
  Likewise, these results show that some factors 
originally thought to be important are not terribly important and that other 
                                                          
13
 See Garon & Ziff, supra note 8, at 490. 
14
 See Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730 (1989). 
15
 Id.  
16
 Id. at 751-52. 
17
 See infra Parts II.E-F. 
18
 Aymes v. Bonelli, 980 F.2d 857, 861 (1992). 
19
 Id. 
20
 See id. at 862-63 (citing six cases decided between 1990 and 1992). 
21
 Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of the Multifactor Tests for Trademark Infringement, 
94 CAL. L. REV. 1581 (2006), Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair 
Use Opinions, 1978-2005, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 549 (2008); Kevin Blum et al., Consistency 
of Confusion? A Fifteen-Year Revisiting of Barton Beebe’s Empirical Analysis of 
Multifactor Tests for Trademark Infringement, 2010 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 3 (2010). 
22
 See infra Part II.F.  
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factors originally thought to be of only moderate importance are actually 
very important.
23
 
 Part II provides historical background on the work made for hire 
doctrine and illustrates how the doctrine has evolved from when its 
foundation was laid in the mid-1800s through the Second Circuit’s 1992 
decision in Aymes.
24
  Specifically, during the course of this discussion, I 
describe the legislative histories leading up to the codification of the work 
made for hire doctrine in the 1976 Copyright Act
25
 and the circuit split 
occurring after its enactment, which eventually led to the Supreme Court’s 
resolution in Reid.
26
  Part II concludes by recounting the Supreme Court’s 
rationale for adopting the multifactor test in Reid
27
 and the Second Circuit’s 
explanation of the important and unimportant factors in Aymes.
28
 
 Part III describes the methodology and results of this study.
29
  In this 
part, I explain the type of data collected, describe how this data is used to 
show four different measures of importance, and display how each factor 
ranks using each measure.
30
  Most importantly, based on the results of these 
measures, I propose a continuum of importance for the Reid factors.
31
  This 
continuum groups together factors sharing similar features with respect to 
the measures of importance.
32
  Part III concludes by testing how useful the 
continuum is at predicting the ultimate outcome of the work made for hire 
cases.
33
 
 Part IV first attempts to situate the results of this study within the 
historical development of the work made for hire doctrine and see whether 
these results cohere with the Supreme Court’s rationales for adopting and 
rejecting the various interpretations existing before Reid.
34
  Part IV then 
considers the implications of this study, paying attention to litigation and 
business-planning contexts.
35
  Special attention is drawn to terminations of 
transfers litigation involving sound recordings as a case study on how the 
results of this study may ultimately affect the outcome of this impending 
litigation.
36
 
                                                          
23
 See infra notes 260-261 and accompanying text. 
24
 See infra Part II. 
25
 See infra Parts II.A-C. 
26
 See infra Part II.D. 
27
 See infra Part II.E. 
28
 See infra Part II.F. 
29
 See infra Part III.  
30
 Id. 
31
 See infra Fig. 1 in Part III.B. 
32
 Id. 
33
 See infra Fig. 2 and preceding discussion in Part III.B.  
34
 See infra Part IV.A. 
35
 See infra Part IV.B.  
36
 See infra Part IV.B.2.  
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II.  AUTHORSHIP AND THE WORK MADE FOR HIRE 
DOCTRINE 
 To understand the modern work made for hire doctrine, it is 
necessary to appreciate how it came into being.  Many of the changes taking 
place in 1976 and subsequent interpretations were heavily influenced by 
earlier copyright acts and how courts construed the work made for hire 
doctrine.  The most significant of these early acts was the 1909 Copyright 
Act.  This part of the Article briefly describes the work made for hire 
doctrine during the pre-1909 period and then discusses the codification of 
this doctrine in the 1909 Act and how the courts gradually, but greatly, 
modified this doctrine.  Afterwards, this part describes the legislative 
history leading to the 1976 Act and the final codification in section 101, 
which left courts struggling with how to determine whether a hired party 
was an employee or independent contractor.  Next, this part explains the 
four approaches lower courts used in making this determination before the 
Supreme Court resolved the issue in its historic 1989 case – CCNV v. Reid.  
Finally, it describes how the Second Circuit in Aymes v. Bonelli put an 
additional gloss on Reid, which serves as the jumping off point for this 
study and is fully explored in Parts III and IV. 
 
A.  Pre-1909 Case Law 
The earliest appearance of the work made for hire doctrine (or at 
least the foundation for the doctrine) occurred in the 1860s.
37
  Prior to this 
time, hiring parties were never entitled to the copyright of the parties they 
hired absent an agreement assigning the copyright to the hiring party.
38
  As 
such, no distinction was drawn between employees and independent 
contractors because hiring parties were not entitled to the copyright by 
virtue of employment.
39
 
During the 1860s, a shift occurred and courts began to recognize 
that hiring parties did have a copyright interest in the works prepared by 
those they hired to create.
40
  One of the earliest cases laying the foundation 
for the work made for hire doctrine was Keene v. Wheatley.
41
 Keene 
                                                          
37
 Catherine L. Fisk, Authors at Work: The Origins of the Work-For-Hire Doctrine, 15 
YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1, 5 (2003) (“The concept began to appear after 1860. . . .”). 
38
 Id. at 32. 
39
 Id. 
40
 Id. 
41
 Keene v. Wheatley, 14 F. Cas. 180 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1861). 
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involved the famous play, Our American Cousin.
42
  In relevant part, the 
British author, Tom Taylor, sold the American rights to Laura Keene, a 
New York City theater owner.
43
  Joseph Jefferson, an actor in Keene’s 
company, adapted the play for performance in Keene’s New York theater.44  
The play became a huge success in New York and Jefferson sold his 
additions in the play to Wheatley and John Clark, two Philadelphia theater 
producers, who had previously acquired a British copy of the play.
45
  After 
a successful exhibition of the play in Philadelphia, Keene filed suit alleging 
copyright infringement.
46
  The court held that Keene did not have a valid 
copyright to the original version of the play because Taylor was not a U.S. 
resident.
47
  Notwithstanding this ruling, the court also held that Keene could 
seek a remedy against Wheatley and John Clark for Jefferson’s additions to 
the play.
48
  As the court explained: 
 
Mr. Jefferson, while in the general theatrical employment of 
the complainant, engaged in the particular office of assisting 
in the adaptation of this play; and made the additions in 
question in the course of his willing performance of this 
duty.  She consequently became the proprietor of them as 
products of his intellectual exertion in a particular service in 
her employment.
49
 
 
In particular, the court declined to hold that the Keene was entitled to the 
copyright as a matter of statutory copyright law but, instead, based its 
holding on equitable principles.
50
   
Eight years later, in Lawrence v. Dana,
51
 a federal court collapsed 
the distinction between statutory copyright law and equitable principles.
52
  
Lawrence involved an international law treatise written by Henry 
Wheaton.
53
  Upon Henry Wheaton’s death, his wife, Catharine, sought the 
                                                          
42
 Id. at 181.  Our American Cousin is famously known as the play occurring at Ford’s 
Theater the night President Lincoln was assassinated by John Wiles Booth.  Fisk, supra 
note 37, at 38 n.125. 
43
 Keene, 14 F. Cas. at 182. 
44
 Id.  
45
 Fisk, supra note 37, at 37-38. 
46
 Keene, 14 F. Cas. at 184. 
47
 Id. at 185; Fisk, supra note 37, at 39. 
48
 Fisk, supra note 37, at 40. 
49
 Keene, 14 F. Cas. at 187. 
50
 Id.; Fisk, supra note 37, at 40. 
51
 Lawrence v. Dana, 15 F. Cas. 26 (C.C.D. Mass. 1869). 
52
 Fisk, supra note 37, at 43. 
53
 Lawrence, 15 F. Cas. at 26. 
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assistance of William Lawrence to prepare a new edition of the treatise.
54
  
As part of the agreement between Catharine and Lawrence, Catharine 
agreed to not make use of Lawrence’s notes in a new edition of the treatise 
without his consent.
55
  Subsequent litigation over the treatise ensued and in 
dictum the court indicated that had the parties not entered into a contract for 
Lawrence to retain the copyright, Catharine would have owned the 
copyright because of the employment relationship between them.
56
  This 
dictum was repeated throughout the rest of the nineteenth century as courts 
reallocated copyright ownership by including an implied contract between 
the parties that favored the hiring party owning the copyright.
57
  Despite 
courts entertaining the idea of the hiring party owning the copyright in the 
absence of an express assignment to that effect, there was confusion about 
whether the default rule favored the hiring or hired party.
58
  The cause for 
this shift from a default rule of hired party ownership to a default rule of 
hiring party ownership is muddled.
59
  Nonetheless, one thing is clear – the 
courts deciding copyright cases during this period drew no distinction 
between employees and independent contractors like is done in the modern 
context.
60
 
It was not until nearly the turn of the century that the principle of 
hiring party-owned copyrights was more firmly established.
61
  In 1899, the 
court in Collier Engineer Co. v. United Correspondence Schools
62
 noted 
that it was the employer of a salaried employee that was the copyright 
owner of instructional materials for a correspondence school.
63
  The 
following year, the court in Dielman v. White
64
 held that “when an artist is 
commissioned to execute a work of art not in existence at the time the 
commission is given, the burden of proving that he retains a copyright in the 
work of art executed, sold, and delivered under the commission rests 
heavily upon the artist himself.”65 
 
                                                          
54
 Id.  
55
 Id.  
56
 Id. at 51; Fisk, supra note 37, at 43. 
57
 Fisk, supra note 37, at 45. 
58
 Id. at 47 (“by the last two decades of the nineteenth century, the law of employee 
copyrights was highly uncertain and the results of cases were quite unpredictable.”). 
59
 See id. at 45 (suggesting the cause of this shift was based on (1) reflecting the intent of 
most parties, (2) employers having a stronger moral claim, or (3) changing assumptions 
about the nature of authorship). 
60
 Id. at 46. 
61
 Id. at 55. 
62
 Collier Eng’r Co. v. United Correspondence Sch., 94 F. 152 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1899). 
63
 Fisk, supra note 37, at 59-60. 
64
 Dielman v. White, 102 F. 892 (C.C.D. Mass. 1900). 
65
 Dielman, 102 F. at 894. 
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B.  The 1909 Act 
 After an uncertain history, Congress finally recognized the work 
made for hire doctrine in the Copyright Act of 1909.
66
  The 1909 Act 
provided that “the word ‘author’ shall include an employer in the case of 
works made for hire.”67  This provision of the 1909 Act resulted from a 
meeting in 1905 between industry leaders and the American Authors’ 
League.
68
  The initial draft stated that only “authors” could obtain 
copyright, but industry leaders objected.
69
  The Copyright Office proposed a 
revised bill that did not have a general work made for hire provision, but 
instead had a section indicating that the “publisher of a composite or 
collective work . . . which has been produced at his instance and expense” 
would be entitled to a copyright.
70
  However, industry leaders were still 
unsatisfied.  As one participant complained: 
 
We have people who work for us who make engravings or 
etchings for us under salary.  Under the new law – if it 
becomes a law as drafted – they would have the right to 
copyright, and I think it would be well to express in such a 
law that where no agreement exists to the contrary the 
payment of a salary to an employee shall entitle an employer 
to all rights to obtain a copyright in any work performed 
during the hours for which such salary is paid.  It seems to 
me these things should not be left to the courts to decide.
71
 
 
Interestingly, this comment indicates that some industry leaders believed 
that the copyright in works created by salaried employees during their 
employment would belong to the employer.
72
  The Copyright Office was 
persuaded by such comments and prepared another draft of the bill, which 
credited authorship to “[a]n employer, in the case of a work produced by an 
employee during the hours for which his salary is paid, subject to any 
                                                          
66
 Michael B. Landau, “Works Made For Hire” After Community for Creative Non-
Violence v. Reid: the Need for Statutory Reform and the Importance of Contract, 9 
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 107, 110 (1990). 
67
 Act of March 4, 1909, ch. 320, §62, 35 Stat 1075, 1088. 
68
 Fisk, supra note 37, at 63. 
69
 Id.  
70
 Id. at 64 (citing 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1909 COPYRIGHT ACT xxiv (B. Fulton 
Brylawski & Abe Goldman eds, 1976)). 
71
 Id. (citing 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1909 COPYRIGHT ACT 65 (B. Fulton 
Brylawski & Abe Goldman eds, 1976)). 
72
 See id. (citing 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1909 COPYRIGHT ACT 65 (B. Fulton 
Brylawski & Abe Goldman eds, 1976)). 
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agreement to the contrary.”73  Later, in 1906, Congress held joint hearings 
and produced the language ultimately ending up in the 1909 Act – “the 
word ‘author’ shall include an employer in the case of works made for 
hire.”74  Unfortunately, Congress failed to define “work made for hire” and 
“employer.”75 
 One of the earliest cases interpreting the 1909 Act’s work made for 
hire provision was National Cloak & Suit Co. v. Kaufman.
76
  In Kaufman, 
the plaintiff, a corporation, claimed a copyright in a fashion book.
77
  The 
defendant reproduced portions of this book and when sued for copyright 
infringement, moved to dismiss.
78
  In the course of opinion, the Second 
Circuit discussed the newly-enacted 1909 Act and the work made for hire 
doctrine.
79
  Importantly, the court noted that “[under the previous law], as 
well as now, the employer had the right to the copyright in the literary 
product of a salaried employe[e].”80 
 The last major development in the work made for hire doctrine 
before enactment of the 1976 Act was Brattleboro Publishing Co. v. 
Winmill Publishing Corp.
81
  In Brattleboro, newspaper advertisers hired 
The Brattleboro Daily Reformer, a local newspaper, to create 
advertisements.
82
  These advertisements appeared in the Brattleboro Daily 
Reformer and subsequently appeared in the Brattleboro Town Crier, a 
direct-mail circular.
83
  The Brattleboro Daily Reformer sued the Brattleboro 
Town Crier for copyright infringement for reproducing the 
advertisements.
84
  On appeal, the Second Circuit stated that in determining 
whether a work was a work made for hire under the 1909 Act, it applied the 
“instance and expense test.”85  That is, the copyright is owned by “the 
person at whose instance and expense the work is done.”86  In Brattleboro, 
the court held that the advertisers, who hired the newspaper, were the 
                                                          
73
 Id. at 66 (citing 3 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1909 COPYRIGHT ACT xxx (B. Fulton 
Brylawski & Abe Goldman eds, 1976)). 
74
 Id. (citing 4 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1909 COPYRIGHT ACT pt J (B. Fulton 
Brylawski & Abe Goldman eds, 1976)). 
75
 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 5.03[B][1][a][i] 
(2012). 
76
 National Cloak & Suit Co. v. Kaufman, 189 F. 215 (C.C.M.D. Pa. 1911). 
77
 Id. at 216. 
78
 Id.  
79
 Id. at 217.  
80
 Id. (emphasis added). 
81
 Brattleboro Publ’g Co. v. Winmill Publ’g Corp., 369 F.2d 565 (2nd Cir. 1966). 
82
 Id. at 568. 
83
 Id. at 567. 
84
 Id.  
85
 Id.  
86
 Id. 
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copyright owners of the advertisements.
87
  Importantly, the Second Circuit 
opined that the “instance and expense test” applied regardless of whether 
the hired party was a traditional employee or an independent contractor.
88
  
Collapsing the distinction between employees and independent contractors 
laid the foundation for some of the confusion arising from the 1976 Act’s 
work made for hire provision. 
 
C.  The 1976 Act – Legislative History and Statutory Text 
 The deluge of technological advancements created in the wake of 
the 1909 Act caused the judges interpreting it to stretch the statutory 
language to its limits to accommodate these developments.
89
  As a result, in 
1955, Congress decided to overhaul the 1909 Act, which included funding 
thirty-five studies on copyright issues.
90
  One of these studies, study number 
thirteen, published in 1958, focused on the work made for hire issue and 
reported the then-current state of the law under the 1909 Act.
91
   
Based on these studies, the Copyright Office prepared a report on 
copyright law revisions, including recommendations on how to deal with 
the work made for hire issues.
92
  This 1961 report recommended that works 
made for hire be defined as “works created by an employee within the 
regular scope of his employment”93 and suggested that commissioned works 
fell outside this definition.
94
  Following publication of the 1961 report, 
stakeholders voiced their concerns about the recommendations.
95
  One 
objection lodged by the motion picture industry concerned the use of the 
phrase “regular scope of his employment” in the definition.96  The movie 
                                                          
87
 Id. at 568.  
88
 Id. at 567-68; see also Martha Graham Sch. & Dance Found., Inc. v. Martha Graham Ctr. 
of Contemporary Dance, Inc., 380 F.3d 624, 635 (2nd Cir. 2004). 
89
 Jessica D. Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative History, 72 CORNELL L. 
REV. 857, 857-58 (1987). 
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Intended, 35 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y OF THE U.S.A. 210, 222 (1988). 
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 See BORGE VARMER, WORKS MADE FOR HIRE AND ON COMMISSION (1958), reprinted in 
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JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG, 1ST SESS., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION (1960). 
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 Hardy, supra note 90, at 224; HOUSE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, 87TH CONG., 1ST 
SESS., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION: REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE 
GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW (Comm. Print 1961) [hereinafter 1961 
Register Report], reprinted in 8 NIMMER, supra note 75, at app. 14. 
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 Hardy, supra note 90, at 224; 1961 Register Report, supra note 92, reprinted in 8 
NIMMER, supra note 75, at app. 14. 
94
 Hardy, supra note 90, at 224; 1961 Register Report, supra note 92, reprinted in 8 
NIMMER, supra note 75, at app. 14. 
95
 Hardy, supra note 90, at 225-28; Landau, supra note 66, at 115. 
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studios thought this language narrowed what the studios had typically been 
able to claim as their own.
97
  None of the objections concerned the 
understanding of what the term “employee” meant.98  In fact, as Professor 
Trotter Hardy describes it, the comments to the 1961 report implicitly 
recognized “employee” to mean formal employees – those paid on a regular 
schedule.
99
 
After these discussions, the Copyright Office published a 
“Preliminary Draft Bill” in 1963.100  This bill defined work made for hire as 
“a work prepared by an employee within the scope of the duties of his 
employment, but not including a work made on special order or 
commission.”101  Although the 1963 Preliminary Draft Bill included a few 
changes to the work made for hire doctrine, it did not define the term 
“employee.”102  Stakeholders’ understanding of the term “employee” 
became clear as a result of the objections to the provision in the 1963 
Preliminary Draft Bill stating that specially ordered or commissioned works 
were not works made for hire.
103
  As the stakeholders argued about the 
status of commissioned works, they frequently contrasted commissioned 
individuals with employees.
104
  Again, as Professor Hardy articulately 
describes, these references to employees almost always describe employees 
as individuals who were formal employees – those who were on the payroll 
and paid a regular salary.
105
 
Following this set of discussions, Congress introduced the 1964 
bill,
106
 which included commissioned works within the definition of “work 
                                                          
97
 Id.  Another objection to the proposal was that employers would not be considered 
authors, but merely owners of the copyright.  Id. at 226. 
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 Hardy, supra note 90, at 226-27. 
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 Id. at 228; Landau, supra note 66, at 115. 
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 Hardy, supra note 90, at 228; Landau, supra note 66, at 115. 
102
 Hardy, supra note 90, at 229. 
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 Id. at 332-35.  The debate about commissioned works was that federal copyright law 
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would no longer exist and the hiring party would not own the copyright unless the hired 
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transfer provisions, which did not apply to works made for hire, caused much consternation 
for the film, textbook, reference publishers.  Id. at 229-32. 
104
 Id. at 232-35. 
105
 Id.  
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made for hire.”107  In fact, the 1964 bill provided that any specially ordered 
or commissioned work would be a work made for hire “if the parties 
expressly agree in writing that it shall be considered a work made for 
hire.”108  This one hundred eighty degree change on specially commissioned 
works raised objections from individual creators who had been routinely 
hired as independent contractors, especially members of the Authors 
League.
109
  After much haranguing, the two sides of the work made for hire 
debate were able to find some common ground and agreed that some types 
of specially commissioned works should be works made for hire, while 
other types were not appropriate for that treatment.
110
  Because the focus of 
this round of discussions centered on specially commissioned parties, rather 
than employees, nothing was said on what constituted an employee.
111
 
At last, in 1965, Congress introduced two bills
112
 which defined 
“work made for hire” as “a work prepared by an employee within the scope 
of his or her employment”113 and also specially ordered or commissioned 
works falling within four categories of works, including a contribution to a 
collective work, parts of a motion picture, translations, and supplementary 
works, if the parties expressly agreed in writing that the work shall be 
considered a work made for hire.
114
  After further discussions, this list of 
categories was expanded to include compilations, instructional texts, tests, 
atlases, and answer materials for a test.
115
  In the Congressional hearing, 
industry witnesses again focused on the specially commissioned works, but 
in reference to this issue, they explained their understanding of what an 
employee was.
116
  As they had in the past, the stakeholders considered 
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employees as those who were paid a salary for either a fixed or indefinite 
term.
117
   
After more than a decade of debates about the work made for hire 
doctrine, the statutory language had been worked out and was enacted, 
albeit a decade later, in the 1976 Copyright Act.
118
  In relevant part, the 
definition of “work made for hire” now reads: 
 
A “work made for hire” is— 
(1) a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his 
or her employment; or 
(2) a work specially ordered or commissioned for use as a 
contribution to a collective work, as a part of a motion 
picture or other audiovisual work, as a translation, as a 
supplementary work, as a compilation, as an instructional 
text, as a test, as answer material for a test, or as an atlas, if 
the parties expressly agree in a written instrument signed by 
them that the work shall be considered a work made for 
hire.
119
 
 
Although the 1976 Copyright Act uses the phrase “a work prepared by an 
employee within the scope of his or her employment,” it fails to define the 
term “employee.”120  Nonetheless, given the extensive legislative history, 
one possibility was that everyone understood the term to mean those who 
were formal, salaried employees.
121
 
 
D.  Different Interpretations of “Employee” Under the 1976 Act 
 The 1976 Copyright Act went into effect on January 1, 1978 and 
courts were quickly confronted with the task of having to interpret the work 
made for hire language in the statute.
122
  During the course of the following 
eleven years, the lower courts adopted four different tests to determine 
whether a hired party was an employee under the first prong on the work 
made for hire definition.
123
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1.  Right to Control Test 
 The first test was known as the “right to control” test.124  Under this 
test, courts looked at “whether the alleged employer has the right to direct 
and supervise the manner in which the writer performs his work.”125  This 
test was borrowed from case law interpreting the 1909 Act.
126
   
One of the first cases adopting the “right to control” test was Town 
of Clarkstown v. Reeder.
127
  In Reeder, the town decided to establish a civic 
project, known as a Youth Court.
128
  As part of this project, the town’s 
Youth Court Executive Board formed various sub-committees, including a 
Constitution Committee and Steering Committee.
129
  Michael Reeder 
voluntarily served on each of these committees.
130
  As part of his role on the 
Steering Committee, Reeder was tasked with preparing a manual for the 
Youth Court.
131
  Reeder drafted the manual “after receiving conceptual and 
practical input from many people,” including guidance from members of the 
different committees and Executive Board.
132
  The chairman of the 
Executive Board relayed feedback from the committees to Reeder and 
served as a sounding board as Reeder prepared the manual.
133
 
Shortly after the manual was complete, Reeder contracted with 
another town to help them create a Youth Court and asserted a copyright in 
the Clarkstown manual.
134
  Initially, Reeder granted Clarkstown a license, 
but after the Executive Committee requested Reeder to assign the copyright 
to the town, Reeder revoked the license and litigation ensued.
135
  At issue 
was whether Reeder was an employee of the town and, as a result, whether 
the manual was a work made for hire with the copyright belonging to the 
town.
136
 
 The court held that Reeder, despite the fact that he volunteered his 
time, was the town’s employee.137  The court held that the crucial factor in 
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determining whether Reeder was an employee “is whether the alleged 
employer has the right to direct and supervise the manner in which the 
writer performs his work.”138  The town had this right to direct and 
supervise the manner in which the manual was created because (1) the 
Chairman of the Executive Board had the power to remove and appoint 
members; (2) Reeder and the Chairman had ongoing discussions about 
drafting the manual, including what to include and change; (3) the 
Chairman assigned Reeder and another volunteer to prepare other 
documents and they did; and (4) Reeder submitted proposals to the 
committees and Executive Board for approval.
139
  The fact that no one from 
the town ever ordered Reeder to write the manual in a specific format was 
not dispositive.
140
  The court emphasized that the employment relationship 
depended on having the right to control, not exercising the right.
141
 
 The court’s justification for this interpretation of the term 
“employee” in the 1976 Act leaves much to be desired.  Rather than looking 
at the legislative history of the 1976 Act, the court reached its conclusion 
about how to distinguish employees from independent contractors by 
relying on three cases interpreting the muddled 1909 Act.
142
 
 
2.  Actual Control Test 
 The second test used by the courts following enactment of the 1976 
Act was the “actual control” test.143  This was a variation of the “right to 
control” test.144  Under the “actual control” test, courts did not just look at 
whether the hiring party could control or direct the work, but looked at 
whether the hiring party actually asserted control over the creation of the 
work.
145
   
 The leading case on the “actual control” test is the Second Circuit’s 
Aldon Accessories v. Spiegel, Inc.
146
  In that case, the plaintiff, Aldon, was 
in the business of designing and selling figurines.
147
  One of Aldon’s 
principals, Arthur Ginsberg, handled the creative aspects of the company, 
including product-design.
148
  In anticipation of a new line of mythological 
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porcelain statuettes, Ginsberg contacted a Japanese firm, Wado, about 
making models for the porcelain statuettes.
149
 
 In addition to describing the pose of the porcelain statuettes and 
sending drawings to Wado, Ginsberg traveled to Japan and worked with the 
Wado artists to develop the porcelain statuette models.
150
  Working with the 
artists included Ginsberg spending “hours and hours changing shapes [and] 
adjusting attitudes and proportions” in addition to giving specific directions 
to the artists on where to position the figures’ heads, legs, and hair.151  
Afterwards, Aldon decided to develop brass versions of the statuettes and 
contacted a Taiwanese firm, Unibright, about creating brass models that 
differed from the porcelain models.
152
  Ginsberg traveled to Taiwan and 
worked with Unibright’s artists in the same way he worked with Wado’s 
artists.
153
 
 After Aldon began selling the statuettes, a buyer for Spiegel 
inspected the statuettes at a trade show and requested a sample.
154
  Aldon 
sent the samples and a few months later discovered Spiegel selling identical 
statuettes in its catalogue.
155
  Aldon sued for copyright infringement and 
prevailed at trial, including on the issue of whether the models created by 
Wado and Unibright were works made for hire.
156
 
 On appeal, Spiegel argued that Wado and Unibright, not Aldon, 
were the copyright owners (i.e. the models were not works made for 
hire).
157
  The Second Circuit disagreed and held that the Wado and 
Unibright artists were employees working within the scope of their 
employment because “Ginsberg did much more than communicate a general 
concept or idea to the [artists], leaving creation of the expression solely to 
them.”158  The court was persuaded by the fact that “Ginsberg actively 
supervised and directed the creation” of the designs and that although he did 
not “physically wield the sketching pen and sculpting tools, he stood over 
the artists and artisans at critical stages of the process, telling them exactly 
what to do.”159   
 In adopting the “actual control” test, the Second Circuit cited to 
several cases interpreting the 1909 Act and noted that there was “[n]othing 
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in the 1976 Act or its legislative history indicat[ing] that Congress intended 
to dispense with this prior law.”160  Rather than dissecting the legislative 
history as Professor Hardy has done, the court concluded that Congress did 
not intend to narrow what was meant by “employee” because there would 
surely have been some discussion of this in the legislative history.
161
  In 
addition to the Second Circuit, the “actual control” test was adopted by the 
Fourth and Seventh Circuits.
162
 
 
3.  Agency Test 
The third test used by the courts following enactment of the 1976 
Act was the “agency” test.163  Under this test, courts determined whether a 
hired party was an employee or independent contractor by using the 
meaning of the word “employee” as understood under agency law.164  
Although there was no federal agency law, the courts suggested using the 
Restatement (Second) of Agency as a guide.
165
  According to the 
Restatement, courts consider the following factors in distinguishing 
between employees and independent contractors: 
 
(a) the extent of control which, by the agreement, the master 
may exercise over the details of the work; 
(b) whether or not the one employed is engaged in a distinct 
occupation or business; 
(c) the kind of occupation, with reference to whether, in the 
locality, the work is usually done under the direction of 
the employer or by a specialist without supervision; 
(d) the skill required in the particular occupation; 
(e) whether the employer or the workman supplies the 
instrumentalities, tools, and the place of work for the 
person doing the work; 
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(f) the length of time for which the person is employed; 
(g) the method of payment, whether by the time or by the 
job; 
(h) whether or not the work is part of the regular business of 
the employer; 
(i) whether or not the parties believe they are creating the 
relation of master and servant; and 
(j) whether the principal is or is not in business.
166
 
 
The leading case using the “agency” test was the Fifth Circuit’s 
decision in Easter Seal.
167
  Easter Seal involved a videotape of a staged 
Mardi Gras style parade.
168
  A representative of the Easter Seal Society 
entered into a contract with a television station to film the parade and edit it 
to be a sixteen-minute segment for the Easter Seal Society’s telethon.169  
The Easter Seal Society representative gave some suggestions to Mr. Beyer, 
the head of the film crew, including camera locations, scenes to look for 
during the parade, and camera angles.
170
  However, it was not clear whether 
Mr. Beyer followed these suggestions.
171
  In addition, the Easter Seal 
Society did not control technical issues, such as lighting, sound, and color 
balance.
172
  Mr. Beyer made all decisions on aesthetics and technical issues 
concerning the cameras and sound equipment.
173
  
After being aired nationally, the television station permitted a 
Canadian television producer to use pieces of the film footage.
174
  As it 
turned out, the Canadian producer used the film in an adult film, Candy, the 
Stripper.
175
  Candy, the Stripper was distributed and shown nationally by 
Playboy and others.
176
  After learning about this, Easter Seal Society filed 
suit alleging copyright infringement.
177
  The district court held Mr. Beyer 
was not an employee of the Easter Seal Society and therefore, the television 
station, which did employ Mr. Beyer, owned the copyright in the film.
178
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On appeal, the Fifth Circuit considered three different interpretations 
of what constituted an employee for work made for hire purposes and 
analyzed the problems associated with each.
179
  The Fifth Circuit discussed 
a variation of the “right to control” test and described it as ignoring the 
distinction between employees and independent contractors.
180
  Under this 
test the courts focus on whether the work was done at the instance and 
expense of the hiring party and ask whether the hiring party had the right to 
control the work.
181
  The Fifth Circuit criticized this test as making the nine 
categories of works under § 101(2) “completely mysterious”182 and also not 
deviating from the interpretation of work made for hire under the 1909 Act, 
despite a belief that Congress was trying to “tighten up the ‘work for hire’ 
doctrine under the 1976 Act.”183 
Likewise, the Fifth Circuit was critical of the Second Circuit’s 
“actual control” test in Aldon.184  The Fifth Circuit was concerned that the 
“actual control” test could result in a lack of consistency between the same 
buyer and seller if more than one work were produced.
185
  Moreover, the 
Fifth Circuit thought the test was overly complicated because if a formal, 
salaried employee were hired, but the work was not actually supervised by 
the employer, then the employer’s copyright would be lost and this “would 
be almost unimaginable.”186  Finally, the Fifth Circuit criticized the “actual 
control” test because it easily slid into the “right to control” test.187 
The Fifth Circuit was also critical of the agency test.
188
  The court 
thought that such an interpretation was radically different from the work 
made for hire doctrine under the 1909 Act and the court was not sure 
Congress had this in mind.
189
  Despite these concerns, the Fifth Circuit 
adopted the “agency” test because it: (1) made sense out of the specially 
commissioned works categories in § 101(2); (2) tied the meaning of “work 
made for hire” to a well-developed doctrine in agency law; (3) enhanced 
predictability; and (4) created a “moral symmetry” with others areas of the 
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law, such as the employer being liable under the theory of respondeat 
superior.
190
 
 
4.  Formal, Salaried Employee Test 
 The final test used by the courts following enactment of the 1976 
Act was the “formal, salaried employee” test.191  Under this test, courts 
initially looked to see if the hired party “[held] himself or herself out as a 
freelancer.”192  If so, then the hiring party should have anticipated the work 
not being a work made for hire.
193
  If the relationship was ambiguous, then 
a variety of factors were examined, most of which were a subset of the 
factors identified under the agency test.
194
  These factors included: (1) 
whether the hired party worked in his or her own studio or on the premises 
of the hiring party; (2) whether the hiring party is in the regular business of 
creating works of the type purchased; (3) whether the hired party works for 
several hiring parties at a time, or exclusively for one; (4) whether the 
hiring party retains authority to assign additional projects to the hired party; 
(5) the tax treatment of the relationship by the parties; (6) whether the hired 
party is hired through the channels the hiring party customarily uses for 
hiring new employees; (7) whether the hired party is paid a salary or wages, 
or is paid a flat fee; and (8) whether the hired party obtains from the hiring 
party all benefits customarily extended to its regular employees.
195
  
Importantly, the “formal, salaried employee” test does not inquire into the 
degree of control and input the hiring party exercises.
196
 
The leading case using the “formal, salaried employee” test was the 
Ninth Circuit’s decision in Dumas v. Gommerman.197 In Dumas, ITT 
Cannon contracted with graphic artist Patrick Nagel to produce four 
paintings that ITT would give out as sets of lithographs to ITT Cannon’s 
distributors as part of a promotional campaign.
198
  ITT Cannon’s advertising 
agency determined the content and some parts of the design, borders, and 
placement of figures and gave Nagel sketches for him to use in making the 
                                                          
190
 Id. at 335.  Although the other justifications are probably self-evident, with respect to 
the fourth justification – moral symmetry – the Fifth Circuit explained “a buyer is a 
statutory ‘author’ if and only if he is responsible for the negligent acts of the seller.  For 
example, a buyer will only be the ‘author’ of a writing if he would be liable under 
respondeat superior in a defamation action based on that writing.”  Id. 
191
 Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 739 (1989). 
192
 Dumas v. Gommerman, 865 F.2d 1093, 1105 (9th Cir. 1989). 
193
 Id.  
194
 Id.  
195
 Id. 
196
 Id. 
197
 Id.  
198
 Id. at 1094. 
42 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. ___ (forthcoming 2015) 
22 
 
illustrations.
199
  After paying for the paintings and distributing some 
lithograph sets, ITT Cannon had some lithographs leftover and eventually 
sold some to Stefan Gommerman, an art gallery owner.
200
  In addition to 
purchasing the lithographs, Gommerman purchased ITT Cannon’s 
copyrights in the works.
201
 
Nagel’s widow, Jennifer Dumas, became the successor in interest in 
Nagel’s copyrights.202  After learning about ITT Cannon’s purported 
transfer of the copyrights to Gommerman, Dumas objected to 
Gommerman’s reproduction and sales of the paintings, claimed she was the 
copyright owner because Nagel was an independent contractor, and filed 
suit for copyright infringement.
203
  Gommerman defended by arguing that 
the paintings were works made for hire because Nagel was ITT Cannon’s 
employee.
204
  The district court granted a preliminary injunction in favor of 
Dumas and Gommerman appealed to the Ninth Circuit.
205
 
 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit perused the legislative history of the 
1976 Copyright Act and acknowledged that the final work made for hire 
language in the statute was the result of a negotiated compromise.
206
  The 
court was reluctant to upset that compromise.
207
  In analyzing the legislative 
history, the Ninth Circuit determined that the negotiating parties used the 
term “employee” when referring to “a salaried worker in a long-term 
position.”208  Because ITT Cannon conceded that Nagel was not a formal, 
salaried employee, the paintings were not works made for hire and the court 
affirmed the district court.
209
 
 The Ninth Circuit recognized that other courts had utilized different 
tests, but criticized those interpretations.
210
  In particular, the Ninth Circuit 
opined that the Second Circuit’s “actual control” test from Aldon failed to 
recognize that the 1976 Act was trying to substantively change copyright 
law under the 1909 Act and that it distorted the balance struck in the 
negotiations between stakeholders.
211
  Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit joined 
the Fifth Circuit’s criticisms of the “actual control” and “right to control” 
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tests.
212
  And although the Ninth Circuit largely agreed with the Fifth 
Circuit’s “agency” interpretation in Easter Seal, it did object to the 
“agency” test as importing the “actual control” or “right to control” tests 
and making it difficult to determine, ex ante, whether the hired party was an 
employee or independent contractor.
213
  Instead, by conceiving of 
employees under the “formal, salaried employee” test, the Ninth Circuit 
believed there would be few disputes concerning the status of the hired 
party.
214
 
 
E.  CCNV v. Reid and the Multifactor Balancing Test 
 Given the four different approaches to determining whether a hired 
party was an employee or independent contractor, it was no surprise the 
Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve this circuit split.  On June 5, 
1989, the Supreme Court handed down its unanimous opinion in 
Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid and interpreted what 
Congress meant by the term “employee” in the work made for hire doctrine 
under the 1976 Act.
215
 
 CCNV was a nonprofit organization committed to eliminating 
homelessness.
216
  In 1985, CCNV hired James Earl Reid to produce a 
sculpture for use in a Washington D.C. Christmas pageant.
217
  Members of 
CCNV conceived the idea of the sculpture as depicting a life-size nativity 
scene, but instead of using the Holy Family, the family would be homeless 
people huddled on a steam grate.
218
  CCNV and Reid never signed a written 
agreement nor did they discuss copyright ownership.
219
 
 During the course of creating the sculpture, CCNV and Reid 
communicated several times about the sculpture design, including the 
position of the family, the items used to hold the family’s personal 
belongings, and who would serve as models for the family members.
220
  
Reid eventually completed the sculpture and it was displayed near the 
pageant site for a month.
221
  The sculpture was returned to Reid for minor 
repairs while CCNV prepared to take the sculpture on tour.
222
  Reid 
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objected to taking the sculpture on tour and when CCNV requested return 
of the sculpture, Reid refused.
223
  Both parties claimed ownership of the 
copyright and CCNV filed suit seeking a declaration of ownership.
224
 
 The district court, after a two-day bench trial, declared that the 
sculpture was a work made for hire.
225
  In particular, the district court held 
that Reid was an employee because CCNV was the motivating factor in the 
production of the work and because CCNV directed enough of Reid’s 
efforts in creating the sculpture CCNV desired.
226
  On appeal, the D.C. 
Circuit reversed and held the sculpture was not a work made for hire.
227
  
The D.C. Circuit adopted the Fifth Circuit’s “agency” test from Easter Seal 
and determined that Reid was an independent contractor rather than a 
CCNV employee.
228
 
 The Supreme Court, in explaining the meaning of the work made for 
hire language, noted that the 1976 Act does not provide a definition of the 
term “employee” and that because of this ambiguity, the four interpretations 
discussed earlier had emerged.
229
  Ultimately, the Court adopted the 
“agency” test because it was “well established that ‘where Congress uses 
terms that have accumulated settled meaning under . . . the common law, a 
court must infer, unless the statute otherwise indicates, that Congress means 
to incorporate the established meaning of these terms.’”230  Because, the 
Court reasoned, Congress used the term “employee” in conjunction with the 
term “scope of employment” – a widely-used term of art in agency law – 
and did not use any other language in the statute to indicate that it meant 
something other than the common law notion of the relationship between 
employers and employees, the common law agency test was appropriate.
231
 
 The Court then fleshed out what it meant by the “agency” test.232  
First, it stated that in determining whether a hired party is an employee, “we 
consider the hiring party’s right to control the manner and means by which 
the product is accomplished.”233  Next, citing section 220(2) of the 
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227
 Id. at 736. 
228
 Id.  The D.C. Circuit also suggested the possibility that the sculpture could have been 
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U.S.C. § 201(a). 
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Restatement (Second) of Agency, the Court listed the following factors as 
relevant to this inquiry: 
 
 the skill required;  
 the source of the instrumentalities and tools;  
 the location of the work;  
 the duration of the relationship between the parties;  
 whether the hiring party has the right to assign additional projects to 
the hired party;  
 the extent of the hired party’s discretion over when and how long to 
work;  
 the method of payment;  
 the hired party’s role in hiring and paying assistants;  
 whether the work is part of the regular business of the hiring party;  
 whether the hiring party is in business;  
 the provision of employee benefits; and  
 the tax treatment of the hired party.234 
  
Although the Court cited the Restatement for the test, it is interesting to 
note that the factors listed in Reid do not match up exactly to those factors 
in the Restatement.
235
  Besides these oversights, the Court failed to provide 
any guidance as to how these factors should be balanced other than noting 
that “[n]o one of these factors is determinative.”236  The Court then applied 
these factors to the facts of the case and held that Reid was an independent 
contractor, not an employee, of CCNV because although CCNV directed 
Reid’s work to the extent it met their specifications, all of the other factors 
weighed in favor of Reid being an independent contractor.
237
 
                                                          
234
 Id. at 751-52. 
235
 Compare  id. at 751-52 with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(2) (1958); see 
also Assaf Jacob, Tort Made For Hire – Reconsidering the CCNV Case, 11 YALE J.L. & 
TECH. 96, 109 (2009).  The Court failed to include some of the Restatement factors and 
added new factors not listed in the Restatement.  Id. at 109.  For example, the Court 
introduced the following factors: the right to assign additional projects to the hired party; 
the extent of the hired party’s discretion over when and how long to work; the hired party’s 
role in hiring and paying assistants; and the provision of employee benefits and tax 
treatment of the hired party.  Id.  Likewise, the Court omitted the following factors listed in 
the Restatement: whether or not the hired party is engaged in a distinct occupation or 
business; the kind of occupation, with reference to whether, in the locality, the work is 
usually done under the direction of the employer or by a specialist without supervision; and 
whether or not the parties believe they are creating the relations of master and servant.  Id. 
at 110.  
236
 Reid, 490 U.S. at 752. 
237
 Id. at 752-53. 
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 In the course of justifying the common law agency test, the Court 
explained that this interpretation furthered “Congress’ paramount goal in 
revising the 1976 Act of enhancing predictability and certainty of copyright 
ownership.”238  In contrast, the “actual control” test undermined 
predictability and certainty because the parties would not be able to know 
until late in the process whether the hiring party had actually wielded 
sufficient control over the hired party.
239
  Because CCNV had conceded that 
the closely-related “right to control” test was difficult to demonstrate 
without actual control, the “right to control” test suffered from a similar 
flaw.
240
 
 In addition to furthering the policy goals of predictability and 
certainty, the Court explained that the “right to control” test focused on the 
relationship between the hiring party and the product rather than the 
relationship between the hiring and hired parties.
241
  Accordingly, this focus 
was misguided because the work made for hire language in section 101 is 
written in terms of the latter rather than former.
242
  Moreover, the “right to 
control” test ignored the dichotomy between works created by employees 
and specially commissioned works because under the “right to control” test, 
a specially commissioned work could also be a work by an employee as 
long as the hiring party had the right to control the product.
243
  In short, the 
“right to control” test would largely eliminate the statutory requirement for 
specially commissioned works of having a signed writing specifying the 
product is a work made for hire.
244
   
Notwithstanding the Court’s critiques of the “right to control” test, 
the test set forth in Reid seemed to adopt that test as the ultimate question in 
the analysis.
245
  The confusion in the Court rejecting the “right to control” 
test while at the same time partially adopting it is that the Court explained 
the “right to control” test differently than the way it was originally stated in 
Reeder.  Under Reeder, the court defined the test as “whether the alleged 
employer has the right to direct and supervise the manner in which the 
[hired party] performs his work.”246  This test is nearly identical to the test 
the Supreme Court partially adopts in Reid.  The “right to control” test 
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rejected in Reid was slightly different.  The Supreme Court’s criticisms 
were aimed at a test focused on whether “the hiring party retain[ed] the 
right to control the product.”247  The difference between these two versions 
of the “right to control” test is that one focuses on the hiring party 
controlling the manner and means of production whereas the other focuses 
on the hiring party controlling the product.
248
  The cases the Supreme Court 
cites to in its discussion of the “right to control” test framed the test in terms 
of the hiring party controlling the manner and means of production, rather 
than the product itself,
249
 but whether this is a meaningful distinction is 
doubtful.
250
 
The “actual control” test suffered from a similar problem of failing 
to dichotomize.  The Court noted that although a work could be a work 
made for hire under section 101(2) and not under 101(1) if the work was 
specially commissioned, but no actual control was exercised, the Court 
found there was no support for this distinction in the statutory language.
251
  
Finally, the Court summarily rejected the “formal, salaried employee” test 
because although there was some support for this approach in the legislative 
history, the work made for hire provision used the term “employee” rather 
than “formal employee” or “salaried employee.”252  In addition, the amici 
arguing for this approach did not agree on the standard for what constituted 
a “formal, salaried employee.”253 
 In sum, the Court’s decision in Reid settled the question that had 
plagued the lower courts for several years.  And although the lower courts 
now had a multifactor test to help them determine whether the hired party 
was an employee or independent contractor, all they were told about the test 
was that no single factor was dispositive.  This lack of further guidance led 
to additional confusion about how the factors ought to be applied. 
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 Reid, 490 U.S. at 738 (emphasis added). 
248
 1 NIMMER, supra note 75, at § 5.03[B][1][a][iii]. 
249
 Reid, 490 U.S. at 738-39 (citing Clarkstown v. Reeder, 566 F. Supp. 137 (S.D.N.Y. 
1983) and Peregrine v. Lauren Corp., 601 F. Supp. 828 (D. Colo. 1985)). 
250
 1 NIMMER, supra note 75, at §  5.03[B][1][a][iii] (“[T]he distinction may import no 
different result in many cases.”).  
251
 Reid, 490 U.S. at 742 (“[T]here is no statutory support for an additional dichotomy 
between commissioned works that are actually controlled and supervised by the hiring 
party and those that are not.”). 
252
 Id. at 742 n.8.  It is worth noting that section 101 also does not use the term “employee 
as understood by the common law of agency.” 
253
 Id.  
42 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. ___ (forthcoming 2015) 
28 
 
F.  Weighting Factors – The Aymes v. Bonelli Three-Year Study 
 Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Reid, the lower courts 
were confronted with how the Reid factors were to be applied.  According 
to the Second Circuit, one district court erred in treating all the Reid factors 
as equally important and simply tallying the factors in making its 
determination.
254
  To provide the lower courts additional guidance in 
applying the Reid factors, the Second Circuit in Aymes v. Bonelli suggested 
that “there are some factors that will be significant in virtually every 
situation.”255  In particular, the Aymes court listed the following Reid factors 
as almost always being relevant and deserving of more weight in the 
multifactor analysis: 
 
 the hiring party’s right to control the manner and means of 
creation;
256
  
 the skill required;  
 the provision of employee benefits;  
 the tax treatment of the hired party; and  
 whether the hiring party has the right to assign additional projects to 
the hired party.
257
 
 
Of these important factors, the Second Circuit additionally noted 
that the employee benefits and tax treatment factors were especially 
probative because “every case since Reid that . . . applied the test . . . found 
the hired party to be an independent contractor where the hiring party failed 
to extend benefits or pay social security taxes.”258  In determining which 
Reid factors were deserving of more weight, the Aymes court did not simply 
pull these five factors out of thin air.  Instead it relied on all of the cases 
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 Read literally, the hiring party’s right to control the manner and means of creation is not 
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 Aymes, 980 F.2d at 861.  
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decided in the intervening three and a half years since Reid – six cases in 
total.
259
 
 With respect to the remaining Reid factors, the Aymes court 
indicated that some were generally of little use in the work made for hire 
analysis.
260
  In particular, the court noted that whether the work is part of 
the regular business of the hiring party and whether the hiring party is in 
business will generally have little weight in the analysis.
261
  
 
III.  UPDATING AYMES – A COMPREHENSIVE MULTIFACTOR 
STUDY 
 The pronouncement of the important factors in Aymes took place a 
mere three years after Reid.  Since Aymes, many more work made for hire 
cases have been decided.  Accordingly, a fresh and more comprehensive 
look at courts’ analyses of the Reid factors will facilitate a greater 
understanding of which factors are the most important in determining 
whether a hired party is an employee or independent contractor.  This study 
examines the universe of work made for hire cases since Reid where a 
determination of the hired party’s status has been made and evaluates which 
factors are and are not important in the analysis.  This part sets forth the 
methodology for locating and coding the cases.  Next, it describes the 
results of this study and clusters the factors based on their importance. 
 
A.  Methodology 
 Using a broad search, I located what I believe to be all of the work 
made for hire cases decided under the 1976 Copyright Act from June 5, 
1989 through February 27, 2014.
262
  After eliminating false positives,
263
 this 
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 I ran the following search in the ALLCASES database in Westlaw, which contains all 
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factor!.  This yielded 108 cases.  Of these 108 cases, forty-three analyzed the Reid factors 
and determined whether the hired party was an employee or independent contractor.  I then 
ran this search in Lexis: employee /para (“work for hire” or “work made for hire”) /para 
factor!.  The Lexis search produced an additional seventeen cases that were not already 
captured in the Westlaw search.  None of these seventeen cases produced a copyright case 
that analyzed the Reid factors and determined whether the hired party was an employee or 
independent contractor.  I then ran this search in Bloomberg Law: employee p/ (“work 
made for hire” OR “work for hire”) p/ factor!.  The Bloomberg search produced an 
additional fifteen cases not already captured in the Westlaw and Lexis searches.  Only two 
of these fifteen cases produced copyright cases that analyzed the Reid factors and 
determined whether the hired parties were employees or independent contractors.  I 
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search yielded forty-six work made for hire cases.
264
  For each case, the 
following information was recorded: whether the court concluded the hired 
party was an employee or independent contractor, the identity of the court 
and which circuit it fell within, the year the case was decided, and whether 
the case cited Aymes in the context of the five factors the Aymes court found 
to almost always be important.
265
 
In addition, for each case two variables were created for each Reid 
factor.  The first variable was whether the factor favored employee status, 
favored independent contractor status, was indeterminate, or was not 
addressed by the court.  These determinations were made based on 
statements by the courts about how these factors affected the outcome.   
The second variable was whether the court weighted each Reid 
factor.  The coding options for this variable were that the court gave 
additional weight to the particular factor, discounted the factor, or did not 
expressly weight the factor.
266
  These too were based on statements (or the 
absence of statements) by the courts about how much weight they were 
giving each of the factors. 
In addition to the twelve Reid factors, two factors that were 
addressed with some frequency were added: (1) the hiring party’s right to 
control the manner and means by which the product is accomplished,
267
 and 
(2) how the hired party and hiring party referred to the hired party.  Finally, 
because the Reid factors are not an exhaustive list, any additional factors the 
                                                                                                                                                   
recognize that there might be other work made for hire cases that have been decided, but 
were not reported in Westlaw, Lexis, or Bloomberg.  See generally Elizabeth Y. 
McCuskey, Submerged Precedent, passim (unpublished manuscript, on file with the 
author) (describing the concept of submerged precedent); Elizabeth Y. McCuskey, Clarity 
and Clarification: Grable Federal Questions in the Eyes of Their Beholders, 91 NEB. L. 
REV. 387, 427-30 (2012) (same).  Given the limited search capabilities of docket 
management systems, it is cost-prohibitive to do any more of an exhaustive search. 
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 The false positives were mostly non-copyright cases (e.g. Title VII) or copyright cases 
where the court did not decide whether the hired party was an employee or independent 
contractor (e.g. denying a motion for summary judgment because there was a genuine issue 
of material fact regarding the analysis).   
264
 In one case, Huebbe v. Oklahoma Casting Co., 663 F. Supp. 2d 1196 (W.D. Okla. 
2009), the court engaged in two separate work made for hire analyses.  Because these 
analyses were distinct, I treated them as two cases.  This explains why although there were 
forty-five cases in the search, I analyzed forty-six cases as part of this study. 
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 The weighting or discounting of the factors could be done either by the court stating that 
the factor generally was entitled to additional weight or should generally be discounted (i.e. 
the court stating that in its circuit, the following factors are important) or during the 
application of the factor to the facts of the particular case (i.e. the court not making a 
pronouncement about the factors’ importance in the abstract, but stating that a particular 
factor was particularly important during the analysis of the facts before it). 
267
 See supra note 256. 
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courts discussed in their analyses were recorded.  All of the additional 
factors were coded the same as the two variables used for the Reid 
factors.
268
 
 
B.  Results 
 Using this data, the following calculations were made: how 
frequently each factor was addressed by the courts, how consistent each 
factor was with the ultimate result about the status of the hired party, and 
how frequently each factor was given additional weight or discounted in the 
courts’ analyses.  These calculations are shown below in Table 1 as 
Frequency,
269
 Consistency,
270
 Favored Weighting,
271
 and Discounted 
Weighting,
272
 respectively.   
These calculations all measure, in some form, the importance of the 
factors.  The frequency with which a factor is analyzed suggests whether 
courts are considering the factor in the first place or simply ignoring it.  A 
frequently ignored factor is less likely to be important than one frequently 
addressed.  Likewise, consistency illustrates importance because a factor 
that is less reliable in predicting the ultimate outcome suggests that courts 
treat that factor as having less impact on the ultimate result than other 
factors.
273
  Finally, whether a factor is discounted or given additional weight 
in the analysis reflects its importance as the courts are directly addressing 
which factors they take more seriously and find more probative in the 
analysis and which factors they routinely declare to be of less importance. 
                                                          
268
 My research assistant and I independently coded all of the variables and then met in 
person to resolve any conflicts in the coding by reviewing the case. 
269
 Frequency for each factor is calculated as 46 total cases minus the number of cases the 
factor was not addressed by the courts. 
270
 Consistency for each factor is calculated by adding together the total number of cases 
where the factor’s outcome is consistent with the court’s ultimate conclusion about the 
hired party’s status.  For example, if the skill required factor favors a finding of employee 
status and the court ultimately concludes the hired party is an employee, then this is 
consistent.  If, however, the court finds that the skill required factor favors a finding of 
employee status, but the court ultimately concludes the hired party is an independent 
contractor, then this is inconsistent.  The percentage in parentheses is calculated by 
dividing this number by the number in the Frequency column.  In other words, when the 
factor is addressed, how consistent is it with the ultimate conclusion? 
271
 Favored Weighting for each factor is calculated by adding together the total number of 
cases where the factor is given additional weight.  The percentage in parentheses is 
calculated by dividing this number by the number in the Frequency column.  In other 
words, when this factor is addressed, how often is it favored? 
272
 Discounted Weighting for each factor is calculated the same way Favored Weighting is, 
but counts cases where the factor is discounted rather than given additional weight. 
273
 Inconsistent factors are also less useful to the parties and attorneys in predicting 
outcomes. 
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Table 1 – Summary Table 
Factor Frequency  Consistency 
Favored 
Weighting 
Discounted 
Weighting 
skill required 26 (57%) 22 (85%) 8 (31%) 1 (4%) 
source of 
instrumentalities 
and tools 33 (72%) 29 (88%) 2 (6%) 1 (3%) 
work location 32 (70%) 24 (75%) 0 (0%) 4 (13%) 
relationship 
duration 29 (63%) 23 (79%) 1 (3%) 2 (7%) 
additional 
projects 29 (63%) 25 (86%) 6 (20%) 1 (3%) 
when and how 
long to work 32 (70%) 26 (81%) 0 (0%) 2 (6%) 
payment method 39 (85%) 33 (85%) 5 (13%) 0 (0%) 
hiring and 
paying assistants 18 (39%) 13 (72%) 0 (0%) 2 (11%) 
part of regular 
business of 
hiring party 29 (63%) 24 (83%) 0 (0%) 4 (14%) 
hiring party in 
business 9 (20%) 4 (44%) 0 (0%) 3 (33%) 
employee 
benefits 36 (78%) 32 (89%) 12 (33%) 2 (6%) 
tax treatment 37 (80%) 32 (86%) 12 (32%) 2 (5%) 
right to control 
manner and 
means 36 (78%) 21 (58%) 5 (14%) 4 (11%) 
label 9 (20%) 5 (56%) 1 (11%) 3 (33%) 
 
Tables 2, 3, 4, and 5 show how each factor fares with respect to each 
of the four calculations.  As illustrated in those tables, some factors tend to 
rise toward the top of the list regardless of which calculation is used.
274
  
                                                          
274
 For example, payment method, employee benefits, and tax treatment are in the top half 
for each calculation. 
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Other factors are stable in the middle
275
 or at the bottom
276
 of the list.  But 
there is some fluctuation of the factors’ rankings across calculations.277 
 
Table 2 
Sorted by Frequency (%) 
Factor Frequency  
payment method 39 (85%) 
tax treatment 37 (80%) 
employee benefits 36 (78%) 
right to control manner and 
means 
36 (78%) 
source of instrumentalities 
and tools 
33 (72%) 
work location 32 (70%) 
when and how long to work 32 (70%) 
relationship duration 29 (63%) 
additional projects 29 (63%) 
part of regular business of 
hiring party 
29 (63%) 
skill required 26 (57%) 
hiring and paying assistants 18 (39%) 
hiring party in business 9 (20%) 
label 9 (20%) 
                                                          
275
 For example, relationship duration is ranked eighth, ninth, ninth, and eighth in Tables 2, 
3, 4, and 5, respectively. 
276
 For example, whether the hiring party is in business is ranked last in every calculation. 
277
 For example, payment method is ranked first when sorted by frequency and discounted 
weighting, but is only sixth for consistency and favored weighting. 
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Table 3 
Sorted by Consistency (%) 
Factor Consistency 
employee benefits 32 (89%) 
source of instrumentalities 
and tools 29 (88%) 
additional projects 25 (86%) 
tax treatment 32 (86%) 
skill required 22 (85%) 
payment method 33 (85%) 
part of regular business of 
hiring party 24 (83%) 
when and how long to work 26 (81%) 
relationship duration 23 (79%) 
work location 24 (75%) 
hiring and paying assistants 13 (72%) 
right to control manner and 
means 21 (58%) 
label 5 (56%) 
hiring party in business 4 (44%) 
 
With respect to weighting factors, it is worth noting that other than 
giving additional weight to employee benefits, tax treatment, skill required, 
and arguably the right to assign additional projects, courts do very little 
favorable weighting.
278
  Discounted weighting is even rarer.  Although the 
hiring party being in business and the label used to describe the hired party 
are discounted thirty-three percent of the time, in terms of raw numbers, this 
discounting occurred in only three cases for each measure.
279
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 See Table 4. 
279
 See Table 5. 
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Table 4 
Sorted by Favored Weighting (%) 
Factor 
Favored 
Weighting 
employee benefits 12 (33%) 
tax treatment 12 (32%) 
skill required 8 (31%) 
additional projects 6 (20%) 
right to control manner and 
means 5 (14%) 
payment method 5 (13%) 
label 1 (11%) 
source of instrumentalities 
and tools 2 (6%) 
relationship duration 1 (3%) 
work location 0 (0%) 
when and how long to work 0 (0%) 
hiring and paying assistants 0 (0%) 
part of regular business of 
hiring party 0 (0%) 
hiring party in business 0 (0%) 
 
Table 5 
Sorted by Discounted Weighting (%) 
Factor 
Discounted 
Weighting 
payment method 0 (0%) 
source of instrumentalities 
and tools 1 (3%) 
additional projects 1 (3%) 
skill required 1 (4%) 
tax treatment 2 (5%) 
when and how long to work 2 (6%) 
employee benefits 2 (6%) 
relationship duration 2 (7%) 
hiring and paying assistants 2 (11%) 
right to control manner and 
means 4 (11%) 
work location 4 (13%) 
part of regular business of 
hiring party 4 (14%) 
hiring party in business 3 (33%) 
label 3 (33%) 
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Although each calculation by itself is helpful in understanding the 
importance of a particular factor in the work made for hire analysis, no 
single calculation can tell the entire story.  For example, if we only looked 
at the frequency with which the factors are addressed, then we might 
conclude that the skill required is one of the least important of the Reid 
factors.
280
  But although frequency tells us how often the courts address the 
factor, it could be that when they do address it, they give it additional 
weight in the analysis because the courts consider it to be important in the 
inquiry.  The skill required factor falls into this category as it is weighted 
favorably 31% of the time.  As described earlier, looking only at the 
weighting calculations is also of limited use because of the small number of 
cases where weight is discussed.
281
  As a result, all of the calculations must 
be examined together to discover which factors are the most and least 
important.  Based on all four calculations in Table 1, I propose that the 
continuum shown in Figure 1 describes the relative importance of the work 
made for hire factors. 
 
Fig. 1 
 
 This continuum groups together factors that share similar features 
with respect to each of the calculations.  For example, the factors listed as 
the most important (tax treatment, employee benefits, and payment method) 
all have high consistency (85% – 89%), are addressed very frequently (78% 
– 85%), are often or sometimes favorably weighted (13% – 33%), and are 
never or infrequently discounted (0% – 6%).  In the next group of factors 
(additional projects, skill required, and source of the instrumentalities and 
tools), these factors all have a high consistency (85% – 88%), but have a 
lower frequency (57% – 72%); they do, however, have significant weighting 
(6% – 31% favorable; 3% – 4% discounting).  Because this group is similar 
                                                          
280
 Skill required is ranked eleventh in Table 2. 
281
 See supra text accompanying notes 278-279. 
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in many respects to the “most important” group, but is addressed with less 
frequency, these factors are grouped together and deemed slightly less 
important. 
 At the other end of the continuum are the least important factors.  
These factors (right to control the manner and means, the label used to 
describe the hired party, and whether the hiring party is in business) have 
very poor consistency (44% – 58%).  And although the right to control the 
manner and means factor is addressed with high frequency (78%), this 
means very little given how inconsistent it is (58%) and that courts also split 
on whether it receives favorable weighting (14%) or is discounted (11%).  
The other two factors in this group are rarely addressed (20%) and are the 
most likely to be discounted in the analyses (33%). 
 Whether a particular factor belongs in one group down or one group 
up is certainly debatable; reasonable minds can differ.  Illustrating the 
importance of the factors using a continuum with fuzzy lines separating the 
groups rather than strict lines of demarcation between the groups was 
purposefully chosen to acknowledge this. 
 To test how useful these groups are at predicting the ultimate 
outcome in a case, the top three factors were analyzed.  If a majority of the 
three factors that were addressed favored the ultimate outcome, this was 
considered a successful prediction.  If only two of the three factors were 
addressed and they were split, this was considered an unsuccessful 
prediction.  Using only the three most important factors (tax treatment, 
employee benefits, and payment method), eighty-seven percent of the cases 
would be decided consistent with courts’ ultimate conclusion.  When this 
study was done using the most important two groups, ninety-one percent of 
the cases would be decided consistent with the courts’ ultimate conclusion.  
In contrast, doing the same analysis using the three least important factors 
yielded a forty-eight percent success rate.  Expanding this to the five least 
important factors improved the success rate to sixty-three percent.  Doing 
the same analysis for the middle three factors yielded a seventy-eight 
percent success rate.  These results are displayed below in Figure 2.  In sum, 
the structure of this continuum appears to correctly illustrate the relative 
importance of the Reid and other commonly-considered factors.
282
 
                                                          
282
 There are, of course, limitations on this study.  The primary limitation is the small 
number of cases (n=46) involved in the study.  Because of this relatively small number of 
cases, it makes it nearly impossible to make the data any more granular.  For example, it 
might be interesting to see if the factors’ importance changes based on the type of industry 
or work at issue.  Although there are some industries or works that occur with some 
frequency (e.g. architecture and software), there are not enough of these cases to be able to 
draw any meaningful conclusions.  Another limitation of this study is the potential for 
selection bias.  That is, the parties or their attorneys deciding which case to bring and not 
bring based on how the courts addressed the factors in previous decisions.  This issue exists 
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Fig. 2 
 
IV.  DISCUSSION 
 The results of this study lead to two broad questions.  First, how do 
these results fit within the long and varied developments of the work made 
for hire doctrine?  Second, going forward, what are the implications of these 
results?  This part explores each of these questions.   
With respect to reflecting on the results in light of the historical 
developments, this part discusses how these results square with the Second 
Circuit’s statement in Aymes about the importance and lack of importance 
of specific factors.
283
  In addition, it examines whether and how these 
results cohere with the pre-Reid interpretations of “employee” and the 
Supreme Court’s rationales for adopting and rejecting these 
interpretations.
284
 
With respect to the implications of these results, this part first 
explores how these results may affect general copyright litigation where the 
parties contest the work made for hire status of a work.
285
  Afterwards, these 
results are situated within the context of the impending litigation concerning 
the work made for hire status of music recorded after 1977.
286
  Finally, this 
                                                                                                                                                   
with any study based on reported cases, but the effect could be more pronounced in this 
situation given the small number of cases. 
283
 See infra Part IV.A. 
284
 See id.  
285
 See infra Part IV.B.1. 
286
 See infra Part IV.B.2.  
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part suggests how these results may be of use to business planning attorneys 
so they can effectively advise their clients to achieve their desired results.
287
 
 
A.  Doctrinal Fit 
 In Aymes, the Second Circuit concluded that the following factors 
were the most important in the multifactor analysis: 
 
 the hiring party’s right to control the manner and means of creation; 
 the skill required;  
 the provision of employee benefits;  
 the tax treatment of the hired party; and  
 whether the hiring party has the right to assign additional projects to 
the hired party.
288
 
 
Of the five Aymes factors, four are within the top two groups of the 
continuum.
289
  The only Aymes factor not in these top two groups is the 
hiring party’s right to control the manner and means of creation.  This factor 
is surprisingly within the least important group of the continuum.  As noted 
earlier, the Supreme Court in Reid suggested this was not itself a factor, but 
was the ultimate question to be answered using the listed factors.
290
  Despite 
this, many lower courts have deemed the right to control a factor, rather 
than the ultimate conclusion.
291
  The lack of importance of this factor is 
surprising given that it is supposed to be determined by the other factors.
292
  
Given that two courts (the Supreme Court and Second Circuit) have 
bolstered the importance of this factor, it is worth emphasizing that other 
courts have, by and large, ignored this authority. 
In addition to overemphasizing the importance of the right to control 
factor, the Aymes court underappreciated the importance of the method of 
payment factor.  The court acknowledged that this could be a “fairly 
                                                          
287
 See infra Part IV.B.3. 
288
 Aymes v. Bonelli, 980 F.2d 857, 861 (2nd Cir. 1992).  
289
 Employee benefits and tax treatment are in the most important group.  The skill required 
and right to assign additional projects are in the second most important group. 
290
 See supra note 256. 
291
 Id.  
292
 In theory, the lack of importance of the right to control factor could make sense given 
the way the Supreme Court and Restatement (Second) of Agency phrase the test as the 
ultimate question.  In other words, if the lower courts interpreted Reid this way, then it 
would not be an important factor because it is not really a factor at all.  However, this 
explanation is not warranted given that the lower courts have frequently treated the right to 
control as a factor (78% frequency).  Ultimately, this factor is not consistent with the 
outcomes and is treated inconsistently by the courts with respect to the weighting. 
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important factor,”293 but as illustrated above, this factor turns out to be one 
of the three most important factors.  To a lesser extent, the source of the 
instrumentalities was underappreciated by Aymes, which is within the same 
group as the skill required factor. 
 In addition to declaring which factors were the most important, the 
Aymes court also opined that whether the work is part of the regular 
business of the hiring party and whether the hiring party is in business were 
of little use in the analysis.
294
  Based on the results of this study, it turns out 
that Aymes was certainly correct with respect to whether the hiring party is 
in business because this factor is in the least important group.  However, 
being part of the regular business of the hiring party is not as 
inconsequential as Aymes made it out to be.  Although not one of the most 
important factors, this factor is in the middle of the pack. 
 In sum, the statements in Aymes about the importance or lack of 
importance of specific factors are largely, but not completely, consistent 
with the results of this study.  Of course, this could be attributed to path 
dependency.  That is, the courts were bound to follow or were heavily 
influenced by Aymes.  Of the forty-six cases, thirty-six postdated Aymes.  Of 
those thirty-six cases, eight (22%) cite to Aymes, or a case citing Aymes, for 
the proposition that the Aymes factors are the important ones.
295
 Although 
path dependency probably had some influence on the ultimate outcome of 
the importance of the factors, the variations between the results of this study 
and the conclusions in Aymes suggest that path dependency was not 
dispositive in determining importance. 
 With respect to the results of this study as they relate to the pre-Reid 
tests for distinguishing employees from independent contractors, two 
observations are in order.  First, as described earlier, although the Supreme 
Court cast the rejected “right to control” test as focusing on controlling the 
product as opposed to controlling the manner and means of production,
296
 it 
is questionable whether there is a meaningful difference between them.
297
  
Nonetheless, the “right to control” test as adopted by the lower courts 
before Reid focused on the right to control the manner and means in which 
the hired party worked.
298
  Even assuming the Supreme Court had correctly 
understood the “right to control” test, the results of this study suggest that 
the right to control is unimportant.  This factor is in the least important 
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 Aymes, 980 F.2d at 863. 
294
 Id.  
295
 Of course, courts that reached a similar conclusion with respect to how they balanced 
the factors could have read Aymes, but failed to cited to the opinion. 
296
 See supra notes 246-249 and accompanying text.  
297
 See supra note 250 and accompanying text. 
298
 See e.g. Town of Clarkson v. Reeder, 566 F. Supp. 137 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). 
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group on the continuum.  As a result, the Supreme Court’s rejection of the 
“right to control” test is consistent with the results of this study.  However, 
because the Supreme Court misunderstood the test, the reason for the 
consistency has little to do with the Court’s rationale for rejecting the 
test.
299
 
 Second, when comparing the “formal, salaried employee” test with 
the results of this study, we see that the Dumas factors tend to line up fairly-
well with the most important factors on the continuum.  Of the eight Dumas 
factors, six are also found in Reid.
300
  Like Aymes, the Dumas factors 
account for four of the top six factors.  But unlike Aymes, the Dumas factors 
account for all three of the most important factors.  The other two Dumas 
factors that are found in Reid – whether the work is part of the regular 
business of the hiring party and location of the work – fall in the middle or 
lower end of the continuum, but not the lowest group as occurred with the 
Aymes factors.  Moreover, one of the Dumas factors not listed in Reid – 
working for several hiring parties or exclusively for one – was addressed in 
four cases as an additional factor.  This was the most common “other” 
factor and although not weighted favorably or discounted, it was 100% 
consistent with the ultimate outcomes in the cases.  Given these results, it 
may be that courts are actually using a variation of the Dumas “formal, 
salaried employee” test.  This comports with Professor Hardy’s view that 
the “formal, salaried employee” test is the appropriate one.301  Recall that 
Professor Hardy argued that the stakeholders assumed this was the test 
when they negotiated the terms of the 1976 Act in light of the 1909 Act, 
which seemed to recognize hiring party ownership of works created by 
salaried employees.
302
  The factors at the important end of the continuum 
support the view that a variation of the “formal, salaried employee” test is 
what the courts are actually using in arriving at their conclusions.  This is an 
interesting result in light of how harshly the Supreme Court treated the 
                                                          
299
 Interestingly, the Restatement (Third) of Agency, published in 2006, defines employee 
as “an agent whose principal controls or has the right to control the manner and means of 
the agent’s performance of work.”  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.07 (2006).  The 
factors from the Restatement (Second) of Agency have been relegated to the comments of 
section 7.07.  Id. at § 7.07 cmt. f.  No court has suggested reviving the right to control test 
in light of this change in the Restatement. 
300
 These factors include: (1) whether the hired party worked in his or her own studio or on 
the premises of the hiring party; (2) whether the hiring party is in the regular business of 
creating works of the type purchased; (3) whether the hiring party retains authority to 
assign additional projects to the hired party; (4) the tax treatment of the relationship by the 
parties; (5) whether the hired party is paid a salary or wages, or is paid a flat fee; and (6) 
whether the hired party obtains from the hiring party all benefits customarily extended to 
its regular employees. 
301
 See supra notes 99, 105, and accompanying text. 
302
 Id. 
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formal, salaried employee test in Reid.
303
  The importance of these factors 
also brings us back full circle to the legislative history of the 1909 Act, 
which focused on employees being salaried.
304
 
 One reason courts gravitate towards the three factors at the 
important end of the continuum could be that they are objectively measured 
and easy to apply.  For example, whether the hiring party treated the hired 
party as an employee or independent contractor for tax purposes only 
involves looking at payroll documents and forms filed with the federal 
government.  Likewise, providing benefits such as insurance is easily 
verified by looking at enrollment data.  Similarly, the method of payment is 
easily determined by looking at paystubs to figure out the frequency and 
amounts paid.  This is not to say that the other factors cannot be easily 
proven by looking at documents or other evidence, but factors such as skill 
required or the right to control the manner and means involve a certain level 
of subjectivity. 
One final note about Reid and the results of this study is apposite.  In 
justifying the “agency” test, the Supreme Court explained that “Congress’ 
paramount goal in revising the 1976 Act . . . [was] enhancing predictability 
and certainty of copyright ownership.”305  Given the results of this study 
and the multitude of cases where summary judgment is denied because of 
an issue of material fact about whether the hiring party is an employee or 
independent contractor, it is doubtful that the “agency” test has achieved 
this result.
306
  Under Reid, courts balance about a dozen factors, some of 
which are consistent with the ultimate conclusion and some of which have 
very little to do with the ultimate result.  It is odd to imagine a multifactor 
balancing test such as the one set forth in Reid as providing more 
predictability and certainty to the parties than a smaller set of factors would 
                                                          
303
 See Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 742 n.8 (1989) (Noting 
that the statutory definition of work made for hire “cannot support [the formal, salaried 
employee test” and that there was disagreement about the exact contours of the test.  This 
test was rejected in a footnote unlike the right to control and actual control tests, which 
were rejected in the main text of the opinion.). 
304
 See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text. 
305
 Reid, 490 U.S. at 749. 
306
 See e.g. Brower v. Martin, 446 F. Supp. 2d 232, 235 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (“In light of these 
and other dispute questions of material fact, the court cannot conclude as a matter of law 
whether plaintiff’s songs constitute works-for-hire or to whom the copyright in these songs 
belongs.”), Ulloa v. Universal Music & Video Distrib. Corp., 303 F. Supp. 2d 409, 416 
(S.D.N.Y. 2004) (“Having examined the Reid–Aymes factors and drawn all inferences in 
favor of the Plaintiff, the Court cannot conclude as a matter of law that either the musical 
composition or the sound recording of the Vocal Phrase were created as works for hire.”), 
Int’l Code Council, Inc. v. Nat’l Fire Prot. Ass’n, Inc., 79 U.S.P.Q.2d 1651, 1673-74 (N.D. 
Ill. 2006) (summary judgment is precluded because “a reasonable trier of facts could 
resolve the Reid multifactor analysis in either party’s favor.”). 
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achieve.
307
  If enhancing certainty and predictability of copyright ownership 
really were Congress’ paramount goals in the 1976 Act, then perhaps the 
Supreme Court should reconsider the Reid test and adopt a subset of factors 
for the courts to consider.  One option would be to only use the factors in 
the most important and second most important groups of the continuum.  
Another option would be to use the factors from the top two groups, but if 
those factors are evenly split, then turn to the less important factors as tie-
breakers.  In the event Congress has the opportunity to revisit the work 
made for hire doctrine and believes predictability and certainty are still 
valuable goals vis à vis copyright ownership, then perhaps Congress could 
provide more guidance as to what constitutes an employer-employee 
relationship by recognizing these factors as existing in tiers.  Neither is 
likely, but given the lack of guidance from the Supreme Court on how to 
balance the factors, lower courts have the flexibility to adopt a formal 
recognition of the important and unimportant factors as suggested by the 
continuum presented here. 
 
B.  Practical Implications 
 Although the fit between the results of this study and the underlying 
doctrine and historical developments is intriguing, these results may also be 
of great value to litigators and business planning attorneys in the field.  
Where the parties dispute the work made for hire status of a copyright, these 
results will help litigators to gather and present evidence concerning the 
doctrine and to better evaluate their cases.
308
  One such instance, explored in 
more depth below, is the upcoming litigation between artists, producers, and 
record companies in regard to songs recorded after 1977.
309
  In the context 
of business planning, these results will help attorneys structure their clients’ 
relationships to help achieve the desired employment status.
310
  Each is 
discussed in detail below. 
 
                                                          
307
 In the consumer context, we see that having too much choice or too many options can 
lead to bad results.  See generally BARRY SCHWARTZ, THE PARADOX OF CHOICE – WHY 
MORE IS LESS passim (HarperCollins Pub. 2004).  Perhaps courts suffer from a similar 
version of analysis paralysis in that they either fail to resolve the issue themselves and 
instead let juries decide or latch onto a subset of factors and fail to engage in a complete 
multifactor analysis. 
308
 See infra Part IV.B.1.  
309
 See infra Part IV.B.2. 
310
 See infra Part IV.B.3. 
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1.  General Work Made for Hire Litigation 
 Litigation involving employment status under the work made for 
hire doctrine can arise in a few situations.  For example, a defendant may 
assert that the plaintiff has no right to assert a claim for copyright 
infringement because the plaintiff is not the legal or beneficial owner of the 
copyright as a result of the work being a work made for hire.
311
  Another 
example is a copyright infringement dispute between the hiring and hired 
parties where the alleged infringer successfully defends by claiming 
ownership of the copyright via the work made for hire doctrine.
312
  Another 
instance could be determining whether artists are entitled to assert 
violations of their moral rights under the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, 
which does not provide moral rights to works made for hire.
313
  Finally, the 
employment status in the work made for hire doctrine may arise in 
situations involving terminations of transfers, which also do not apply to 
works made for hire.
314
  In these situations, determining whether a party is 
an employee or independent contractor may entirely or partially dispose of a 
case or significantly shift negotiating power when trying to settle a dispute. 
 Armed with the results of this study, litigators engaged in discovery 
can focus their energy and clients’ money on the factors at the most 
important end of the continuum and pay less attention to those at the least 
important end.  After completing discovery, the attorneys can use the 
continuum to decide how to present their arguments in favor of and against 
a work made for hire conclusion.  For example, in a motion for summary 
judgment, rather than simply analyzing the factors in the order presented in 
Reid, it may be more persuasive to analyze the factors in the order of 
importance.  If most of the factors at the important end of the continuum 
support the movant, then presenting them this way may cause the judge to 
grant the motion.
315
  Likewise, if the factors at the more important end are 
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 Only the legal or beneficial owner of an exclusive right is entitled to institute an action 
for copyright infringement.  17 U.S.C. § 501 (2012). 
312
 See e.g. Maness v. Heavrin, 97 F.3d 1457, 1457 (8th Cir. 1996).  The reason this 
situation arises is because one cannot infringe a copyright they own.  Richmond v. Weiner, 
353 F.2d 41, 42 (9th Cir. 1965) (“[a] copyright owner cannot infringe against his own 
copyright.”). 
313
 17 U.S.C. § 101(2)(B) (defining “work of visual art” as not including a work made for 
hire.). 
314
 17 U.S.C. § 203(a) (“In the case of any work other than a work made for hire, [certain 
granted rights are] subject to termination . . . .”).  For a more detailed analysis on 
termination rights, see infra Part IV.B.2. 
315
 This is not to say that simply reordering the factors will cause a change in outcome in 
most cases.  In fact, considering how to present the factors may only be useful in borderline 
cases where a court is on the fence about granting or denying a motion for summary 
judgment. 
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split, the non-movant may want to present the factors like this to avoid 
summary judgment.  In addition to gathering and presenting evidence of 
employment status, these results should assist attorneys in evaluating their 
clients’ cases and giving more informed recommendations about whether to 
settle a dispute and for how much.
316
  In short, focusing on the most 
important factors can provide the increased predictability and certainty that 
the Court in Reid thought it was providing. 
 
2.  Specific Work Made for Hire Litigation – Terminations of Transfers 
and Sound Recordings 
 One of the most interesting areas of copyright law where the work 
made for hire status will arise is with respect to terminations of transfers in 
sound recordings.  Section 203 of the Copyright Act permits termination 
right owners to end certain post-1977 transfers of a copyright and reclaim 
the copyright for themselves.
317
  That is, if the work and type of transfer are 
eligible for termination and the termination right is exercised, all the rights 
covered by the transfer revert back to the owner of the termination 
interest.
318
  As a result, the termination right holder gets a second bite at the 
apple and can attempt to negotiate a new license or assignment on more 
favorable terms.
319
 
For example, imagine an unknown artist records a song at her home 
studio and in 2014 successfully sells her copyright in the sound recording to 
a record company for a measly sum.  The recording turns out to be a huge 
success and the record company earns millions of dollars from exploiting its 
acquired rights in the recording.  Under section 203, after thirty-five years, 
the recording artist could reclaim the copyright in the sound recording.  If 
                                                          
316
 It is unclear if the parties would settle even if they knew this information.  Looking at 
the forty-six cases involved in this study, in twenty-two (48%) of them, 100% of the factors 
that were addressed and not indeterminate were consistent with the ultimate outcome in the 
case (e.g. if nine factors were addressed, the court held all nine weighed in favor of the 
outcome).  In ten of the cases (22% of the total), only one factor was inconsistent with the 
ultimate conclusion.  Combined, 70% of the cases involved a situation where zero or one 
factor was inconsistent with the ultimate outcome.  Once the attorneys in these cases knew 
what the facts were, it is hard to understand why the attorneys for the eventually-losing 
parties would push ahead with this aspect of the litigation. 
317
 17 U.S.C. § 203. 
318
 17 U.S.C. § 203(b). 
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 Corey Field, Their Master’s Voice, 48 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 145, 155 (2000).  
Sections 304(c) and (d) of the Copyright Act are additional termination of transfers 
provisions, but apply to copyrights transferred before 1978.  17 U.S.C. §§ 304(c), (d).  Like 
section 203, these sections also exclude works made from hire from termination.  But 
because the works were created before 1978, the 1909 Copyright Act’s work made for hire 
doctrine applies rather than the modern doctrine. 
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the record company wanted to continue exploiting the recording, it would 
be forced to sit down at the negotiating table with the recording artist and 
reach a new deal.  Presumably, the recording artist will negotiate a better 
deal in 2049 than she did in 2014. 
As illustrated by this example, the termination of transfer right is a 
powerful one.  As it turns out, 2013 was the first year of terminations under 
section 203
320
 and a wave of termination disputes is expected over the next 
several years.
321
  These disputes (and the inevitable litigation accompanying 
them) will turn, in part, on the outcome of the work made for hire analysis 
and what it means to be an employee versus an independent contractor 
because termination of transfer rights do not exist for works made for 
hire.
322
  Instead, an employer whose employee created a copyrightable work 
will be the author and can enjoy the copyright for the duration without the 
fear of losing the copyright thirty-five to forty years later.  To be sure, 
terminations of transfers under section 203 apply to all types of 
copyrightable works.  But the looming litigation involving terminations of 
transfers of sound recordings is a good case study for analyzing how the 
Reid factors should be analyzed and what the likely outcome is in light of 
the factors’ relative importance.   
To appreciate the work made for hire analysis of sound recordings, 
it is necessary to understand what sound recordings are and the potential 
authors laying claim to those copyrights.  Sound recordings are “works that 
result from the fixation of a series of musical, spoken, or other sounds . . . 
regardless of the nature of the material objects . . . in which they are 
embodied.”323  Sound recordings are to be distinguished from musical 
works, which are the underlying composition and lyrics.
324
  An artist who 
sings and records a song written by someone else has created a 
copyrightable sound recording, but has no copyright interest in the 
underlying composition.
325
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 Section 203 applies to transfers made on or after January 1, 1978.  The five-year 
termination window begins thirty-five years after execution of the transfer.  Therefore, the 
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WORK MADE FOR HIRE 
47 
 
There are three major players in the sound recording industry who 
are likely to make a claim as being an author of a particular sound 
recording.  First are the recording artists themselves.  The artists are the 
individuals in the recording studio and creating the sounds by playing the 
instruments and singing the lyrics.  Artists could be solo artists such as Billy 
Joel and Madonna or groups like Aerosmith and Bon Jovi.  The House 
Report accompanying the Sound Recording Act of 1971
326
 suggests that 
recording artists can be authors of sound recordings.
327
  The Copyright 
Office does the same.
328
 
Second are the producers.  Producers come in all forms, but many of 
the most successful are those who are the driving force behind the 
recording; they are the ones with a vision of the recording and orchestrate 
everything from the lead vocals to instrumental solos to background 
vocals.
329
  Producers bring their experience with songwriting and arranging, 
musical performance, and recording to the table along with their musical 
philosophy, knowledge of the music business, and rapport with artists to 
create the sound eventually heard by the public.
330
  Just as with recording 
artists, the House Report and Copyright Office suggest that producers may 
have a claim to authorship of sound recordings.
331
 
 Third are the record companies.  The role of the record company has 
changed over time.  Initially, the record companies exercised a great deal of 
control over the creative process.
332
  But beginning in the 1970s, record 
companies narrowed their focus to manufacturing and promoting the sale of 
records.
333
  Nonetheless, record companies have not really abdicated all 
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control over the creation of sound recordings
334
 and have a strong interest in 
claiming these recordings as works made for hire.
335
  In fact, nearly all 
recording contracts between record companies, artists, and producers 
contain clauses stating that the sound recordings are works made for hire 
and are owned by the record companies.
336
  Unfortunately for the record 
companies, merely declaring a work to be a work made for hire does not 
necessarily make it so.
337
  This is because such statements are only relevant 
for specially commissioned works made for hire, not those falling under the 
employee within the scope of employment provision.
338
 
As a result, an analysis of the Reid factors is necessary to determine 
whether artists and producers are employees of the record companies or 
independent contractors and hence whether the sound recordings are works 
made for hire.
339
  The remainder of this part analyzes the Reid factors in 
light of common practices in the music business.  Then, using the 
continuum of importance, this part determines whether artists and producers 
are likely to be deemed employees and provides an in-depth roadmap for 
litigants and judges to analyze this issue in the upcoming cases.  That being 
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said, a word of caution is in order.  Like with most general rules, there are 
exceptions.  Contracts and practices in the record industry are no different.  
Every recording contract is not the same and what may be a general practice 
might not apply in a particular case. 
 
a.  Group #1 
 Starting with the most important group of factors, the first factor to 
consider is the tax treatment.  This factor likely weighs in favor of artists 
and producers because record companies “rarely withhold income taxes or 
contribute to social security.”340   
The second factor is whether employee benefits are provided.  This 
factor is a tossup with respect to artists, but definitely weighs in favor of 
producers.  As a general rule, record companies do not provide health 
insurance, dental insurance, or retirement funds.
341
  Nonetheless, the two 
major artist unions – AFTRA and AFM – provide health and retirement 
funds for their members.
342
  Although not directly providing these 
traditional benefits, record companies are required to contribute to these 
unions’ health and retirement funds as part of their agreements with the 
unions.
343
  As a result, although not directly paying for employee benefits, 
the record companies are indirectly providing them to those who qualify.  
Similar agreements for the funding and provision of benefits do not exist for 
producers.
344
  In sum, record companies have a colorable argument that they 
provide benefits to artists, but not for producers.  This factor could go either 
way with respect to artists, but certainly weighs in favor of producers. 
The last factor in this group is the method of payment.  Although 
record companies have a little room to argue this factor weighs in their 
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favor, it overwhelmingly favors artists and producers being treated as 
independent contractors.  Artists and producers are compensated identically 
in two ways – advances and royalties.  Artists are also compensated in a 
way producers are not – union scale.345  Artists and producers receive 
advances as part of a recording fund or are given separate cash advances 
that are not tied to the recording fund.
346
  Under a recording fund 
arrangement, the artist or producer pays for the recording costs and if any 
money remains at the close of production, the artist or producer keeps the 
rest.
347
  Any advances or recording funds are paid in installments with a 
percentage paid before commencement of the recording and the remainder 
of the payments made at various benchmarks along the way and upon 
delivery and acceptance of the masters.
348
  Compensation via an advance 
suggests that artist and producers are independent contractors as payment 
by the job, instead of by the hour, is indicative of an independent contractor 
relationship.
349
  
Artists and producers are also paid a royalty based on sales of the 
album.
350
  These royalties are not paid to the artist and producer until the 
record company has recouped its recording costs, including any advances 
paid to the artist and producer.
351
  Once recouped, record companies 
generally pay artists’ and producers’ royalties twice a year, although some 
do so quarterly and others annually.
352
  Like with advances, the payment of 
royalties is not like an hourly wage or fixed salary paid to employees at 
frequent intervals.  The payments cover a several-month period and the 
amount varies depending on the success of the album.  As a result, this 
method of payment also favors artists and producers being classified as 
independent contractors. 
Finally, artists may be compensated at union scale.
353
  For singers, 
as opposed to musicians, AFTRA provides minimum rates that artists must 
be compensated at, even if the artists are entitled to royalties.
354
  Union 
scale under AFTRA is calculated as the greater of a per-hour amount or per-
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side (per song) amount.
355
  However, it should be noted that these payments 
are capped at three times the minimum scale per side.
356
  With respect to 
payment of artists at union scale as calculated by the hour, this method of 
payment looks more akin to an hourly-wage arrangement for an 
employee.
357
  Nonetheless, the fact that record companies pay this amount 
at all has more to do with their agreement with the union rather than the 
relationship to the artist, which undercuts the force of this argument.
358
  But 
if payments are calculated by the per-side method, they appear to be 
payments by the job and artists are likely to be deemed independent 
contractors.
359
  In sum, the method of payment factor overwhelmingly 
favors artists and producers being treated as independent contractors. 
 
b.  Group #2 
Moving on to the second most important group of factors, the first 
factor to consider is whether the hiring party has the right to assign 
additional projects to the hired party.  This factor probably favors artists 
being treated as employees, but producers as independent contractors.  Most 
recording contracts are structured so the artist is required to create one 
album, but the record company is also given a series of options to extend 
the agreement for several more albums.
360
  The number of options the 
record company has depends on the bargaining power of the artist, but five 
or six options are common.
361
  Unlike artists, agreements between 
producers and record companies do not give the record company options to 
require the producer to produce another album.
362
 
The second factor in this group is the skill required.  This factor 
likely weighs in favor of artists and producers being independent 
contractors.  As to artists, the record companies expend a tremendous 
amount of energy trying to find which artists to sign and which to pass 
                                                          
355
 Id.; KRASILVSKY & SHEMEL, supra note 336, at 17 (“A side customarily consists of a 
single composition with a minimum duration of 2 ½ minutes.”). 
356
 BEVERLY HILLS BAR ASS’N, supra note 336, at 230. 
357
 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220 cmt. j (1958). 
358
 This same argument could undercut record companies’ position with respect to artists’ 
benefits, which is already an uncertain proposition.  See supra notes 341-344 and 
accompanying text. 
359
 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220 cmt. j (1958). 
360
 KRASILVSKY & SHEMEL, supra note 336, at 203 (“Many recording contracts call for 
additional recordings at the option of the record company.”). 
361
 MCPHERSON, supra note 341, at 59. 
362
 See SCHULENBERG, supra note 336, at 210-11 (describing how producers may be given 
a right to produce subsequent albums if a certain number of copies are sold). 
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on.
363
  Not every artist can fill the void in the market the record company is 
looking to capture and performing that sound can be quite a unique skill.
364
  
The record companies seem to acknowledge this unique skill when they 
include provisions in the recording contracts that the artists are of a special 
and unique character that gives them peculiar value.
365
  Although drafted to 
allow record companies to obtain injunctive relief if artists try to record for 
other record companies during their contracts, these provisions may likely 
be used to hoist the record companies by their own petards.  For producers, 
creating a sound recording is a highly-skilled job in that the producer not 
only needs to have a grand vision for what the album or record will sound 
like, but also frequently makes musical suggestions to achieve that sound.
366
  
As with artists, the contracts between record companies and producers 
contain clauses providing that the producers and their skills are special and 
unique.
367
 
 The final factor in this group looks at the source of the 
instrumentalities and tools.  This factor likely favors artists and producers or 
is neutral.  Although record companies sometimes own their own recording 
studios, it is rare that artists actually record there.
368
  If the recording is done 
at an independent studio, this factor would be neutral.  However, sometimes 
the producer or even the artist owns the recording studio and equipment.
369
  
In such a case, this factor could weigh in favor of the artists or producer 
being an independent contractor.  As far as providing the instruments used 
during the recording sessions, these are normally owned by the artists and 
are sometimes purchased or paid off using the advance received from the 
record company.
370
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c.  Group #3 
The third group of factors along the continuum of importance also 
has three factors.  The first factor in this group is the extent of the hired 
party’s discretion over when and how long to work.  Who this factor 
benefits may very well depend on the stature of the artist or producer.  
Brand new artists and producers are given little control over issues such as 
the time for recording.
371
  But over time, artists and producers can secure 
control over this aspect of their recordings.
372
 
 The second factor in this group is whether the work is part of the 
regular business of the hiring party.  This factor certainly favors the record 
companies.
373
  Record companies are, and always have been, in the business 
of creating or acquiring rights to sound recordings and having those 
recordings distributed.
374
  Recording the albums that will eventually be 
distributed falls perfectly in line with these business practices. 
 The final factor in this group is the duration of the relationship 
between the parties.  Artists and producers will probably be treated 
differently with respect to this factor.  As mentioned earlier, recording 
contracts with artists are typically for a certain number of albums and the 
record company has several options to extend the relationship.
375
  As a 
result, the exact duration of the relationship can be difficult to determine,
376
 
but typically lasts for a period of several years,
377
 although usually not more 
than five to seven years.
378
  These long durations weigh in favor of artists 
being deemed employees. 
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 Producers, on the other hand, are not typically signed to agreements 
giving the record companies options to have producers work on subsequent 
albums.  Instead, a producer’s working relationship with the record 
company is based upon the success of earlier recordings.
379
  Producers are 
almost always hired on a project basis rather than a number of years.
380
  In 
fact, sometimes producers are hired to work on a single song rather than an 
entire album.
381
  As a result, the duration factor weighs in favor of 
producers being treated as independent contractors. 
 
d.  Group #4 
 Moving on to the less important end of the continuum, there are two 
factors to consider.  The first factor is the location of the work.  This factor 
likely weighs in favor of artists and producers as independent contractors.  
Although record companies may have their own in-house studios
382
 and 
prefer that they be used,
383
 it is rare for artists to record at those studios.
384
  
Instead, the record companies try to include a provision in their contracts 
giving the record company the right of final approval of the recording 
studio.
385
  In practice, the record companies will approve any legitimate 
studio.
386
  Given that very few recordings occur at the record companies’ 
studios, that the choice of the recording studio is made by artists and 
producers,
387
 and that the record companies rarely exercise their ability to 
veto a location, this factor probably favors artists and producers as 
independent contractors. 
 The second factor in this group is the hired party’s role in hiring and 
paying assistants.  This factor probably weights in favor of artists and, to a 
lesser extent, producers being independent contractors, but may depend on 
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WORK MADE FOR HIRE 
55 
 
the use of a recording fund and recoupment.  In terms of selecting those 
who contribute to the recording, the artists and producers typically choose 
which engineers, non-featured musicians, and non-featured vocalists to 
hire.
388
  The selection of the producer is a bit more involved.  To the record 
company, selection of the producer is one of the more important provisions 
of the recording contract.
389
  These provisions usually state that the 
producer will be mutually selected by the artist and record company.
390
  In 
practice, however, the artist selects the producer, the record company 
consults and generally defers to the artist unless the record company has 
had a bad experience with the artist’s choice.391  Thus, it appears that artists 
and producers play a large role in hiring assistants. 
 Paying for those assistants is a bit more complicated.  Today, artists 
pay for third parties out of a recording fund.
392
  Under this approach, the 
recording costs and artist’s advance are combined into a single fund and the 
artist is responsible for paying all recording costs out of this fund.
393
  Any 
money leftover is the artist’s to keep as an advance.394  As a result of this 
payment scheme, recording contracts include clauses specifying that the 
artist is solely responsible for paying all third party charges incurred in the 
production of the record.
395
  Because the artist advance and recording costs 
are combined into one fund that is delivered to the artist to administer
396
 and 
the contract provisions describe the artist as being responsible for payment, 
it appears that this factor weighs in favor of the artist being an independent 
contractor. 
 Although the recording fund is more common today, it was common 
for the artist (especially a new artist) to be paid a separate advance and for 
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the recording company to pay the recording costs.
397
  Although this 
arrangement suggests that the record companies paid for assistants, it is 
important to remember that all of the recording costs are treated as advances 
to the artist.
398
  As a result, these costs are recoupable from the artist’s 
royalties.
399
  Because of this, if the artist earns a sufficient amount of 
royalties, it is the artist, not the record company, who pays for the recording 
costs.
400
  Of course, if the artist is never successful, then the record 
company will not recoup these costs and will end up paying for them.  Who 
ultimately pays for the assistants under the older method of payment 
depends on whether the artist’s album is a commercial success.   
In sum, this factor probably weighs in favor of artists and, to a lesser 
extent, producers being independent contractors.  Regardless of how these 
assistants are paid, the artist and producer choose who works on the 
recording.  When a recording fund is used, the case for independent 
contractor is strengthened.  However, if the record company did not use a 
recording fund and the costs are not recouped, then the record company will 
have a stronger argument that this factor weighs in favor of the artist and 
producer being employees. 
 
e.  Group #5 
Concluding with the least important group of factors, the first factor 
to consider is the right to control the manner and means by which the 
product is accomplished.  Whether this factor weighs in favor of artists and 
producers being independent contractors or employees is difficult to 
determine.  Prior to the 1970s, record companies exercised a large amount 
of creative control over the recording process, but since then, artists and 
producers have moved away from an in-house creative process and are 
exercising more creative control in recording.
401
  Today, for newer artists 
and producers, the record companies may have language in the recording 
contracts requiring the artist and producer to submit written recording 
budgets specifying who the producer is and the financial agreement 
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between the artist and producer, the songs to be recorded, the 
accompaniment and arrangement of the recordings, any recording fees that 
will exceed union scale, the dates and locations of the recordings and 
mixing, and the estimated costs of these sessions.
402
  Despite this contract 
language, in practice, written recording budgets are not always submitted or 
followed.
403
  More experienced artists and producers may, however, secure 
more control over the creative process, including the selection of music, 
recording location and time, final sound mix, and recording budgets.
404
  As 
a general matter, the record companies may have a better chance at artists 
and producers being employees under the right to control factor when the 
artists and producers are inexperienced.  But the amount of control over the 
creative process wanes as artists and producers get more experience. 
 Specific components of recording that are important in the creative 
process are controlling music selection, monitoring what takes place during 
recording sessions, and selecting where the recording occurs.  For music 
selection, the standard recording contract provides that the record company 
will select the music to be recorded.
405
  But in practice, the record company 
gives the artist a say in the decision.
406
  It is common today for the record 
company to only reserve a right of approval of the music selection.
407
  This 
is especially true for more seasoned artists.
408
  That said, there are actually 
very few disputes about song choice.
409
 
 With respect to where the recording occurs, as discussed in 
connection with the work location, record companies try to include clauses 
giving the record company approval rights of the recording studio.
410
  In 
practice, the producer will normally choose the studio to work in
411
 and the 
record companies will approve any legitimate studio.
412
  In addition to 
where the recording occurs, recording contracts typically contain a 
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provision that the record company has the right to have a representative 
present to supervise the recording session.
413
  Nonetheless, it is very rare for 
record companies to actually send a representative to the studio to 
supervise.
414
 
 Although it appears that record companies actually exercise very 
little control over the creative process, they do reserve the right to do so in 
the recording contracts they enter into with artists and producers.  As this 
factor really focuses on the right to control instead of actual control, which 
was rejected by the Supreme Court in Reid, it is likely that this factor will 
weigh in favor of artists and producers being considered employees. 
The second factor in this group is the label the hired and hiring party 
use to describe the hired party.  This factor certainly weighs in favor of 
artists and producers being deemed employees.  Nearly every recording 
contract written since 1978 states that the works created by artists and 
producers are works made for hire.
415
  Although many of the terms of a 
recording contract are negotiable, this one is not.
416
 
The final factor in the least important group of factors is whether the 
hiring party is in business.  Record companies are obviously in business.
417
  
This factor clearly weighs in favor of the artists and producers being 
employees. 
 
f.  Conclusions for the Music Industry 
 Table 6, below, summarizes the analysis of the Reid factors as 
applied to sound recordings in the music industry.  This table sorts the 
factors by order of importance.  A checkmark indicates this factor likely 
weighs in favor of that party’s favored position (i.e. independent contractor 
for artist and producers, employees for record companies).  A question mark 
indicates that it is unclear which way that factor applies. 
 
Table 6 
Summary of Sound Recording Analysis 
Factor Artists Producers 
Record 
Companies 
Tax Treatment    
Employee Benefits ?  ? (artists) 
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Payment Method    
Additional Projects    (artists) 
Skill required    
Source of 
Instrumentalities & 
Tools  or neutral  or neutral  
When & How Long to 
Work 
? – new 
 – established 
? – new 
 – established 
? (new 
artists & 
producers) 
Part of Regular 
Business of Hiring 
Party    
Relationship Duration    (artists) 
Work Location    
Hiring & Paying 
Assistants    
Right to Control 
Manner & Means    
Label    
Hiring Party in 
Business    
 
As illustrated in Table 6, it is nearly certain that producers will be 
treated as independent contractors.  Five, and possibly six, of the most 
important factors weigh in favor of producers as independent contractors.  
In fact, the only factors suggesting producers would be employees are the 
part of the regular business of the hiring party and the three least important 
factors on the continuum.   
The case for artists is more difficult.  Nonetheless, it is more likely 
that artists will be deemed independent contractors.  Of the three most 
important factors, two clearly weigh in favor of artists as independent 
contractors.  The other factor (employee benefits) is unclear.  As described 
earlier, when a party has two of these three factors in its favor, the courts 
find in favor of that party 87% of the time.
418
  Expanding this to the next 
group of factors, one favors the record companies, one favors the artists, 
and the remaining factor either favors the artists or is neutral.  If a court 
were to rule that either the employee benefits or source of the 
instrumentalities factor favored the artists, then a majority of the top six 
factors would favor the artists.  As described earlier, when a party has a 
majority of these six factors in its favor, the courts find in favor of that party 
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91% of the time.
419
  The next group of factors favors the record companies 
when the artist is new and is split two to one when the artist is established.  
This group is helpful to the record companies, but they face an uphill battle 
given that the more important factors favor artists.  The fourth group of 
factors favors artists, which tips the scales slightly more towards artists 
being considered independent contractors.  However, the least important 
factors all support the record companies.  Of course, these are the least 
important factors, so their utility to the record company is of little value.  
Given the results of the most and second-most important groups of factors, 
this will likely carry the day and artists will be deemed independent 
contractors.  That said, the record companies have a colorable argument that 
artists should be treated as employees and this argument should not be 
considered futile.
420
  Hopefully, the results of this study and the analysis 
above provide a useful roadmap for litigants and judges navigating the 
upcoming termination of transfer cases. 
 
3.  Business Planning 
 In addition to assisting litigators to evaluate and present their cases, 
the results of this study will aid business planners in structuring 
relationships between hiring and hired parties.  For example, if a hiring 
party seeks initial ownership of the copyright, it will be best advised to 
withhold income taxes and issue a W2 rather than a 1099, provide employee 
benefits such as life and health insurance, and pay the hired party at 
regularly intervals.  To further ensure a work made for hire result, the hiring 
party could also include a provision in the agreement that reserves the right 
for the hiring party to assign additional projects to the hired party.  And 
although difficult to control in some circumstances, the hiring party should 
provide as many of the tools as possible.  Structuring the relationship this 
way forces the three most important factors and one or two of the factors in 
the second group to weigh in favor of employee status.  This should all but 
assure a conclusion that the hired party will be an employee. 
 Likewise, for attorneys representing hired parties who would like to 
retain initial ownership – to take advantage of the termination of transfer 
provisions or to further exploit the copyright – they should insist on the 
hiring party not withholding taxes and issuing a 1099, refuse insurance 
coverage, and demand payment upon completion of projects or portions of 
projects.  Submitting invoices to the hiring party upon completion would be 
a wise practice to adopt.  Moreover, resisting a provision to accept 
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additional projects and actually refusing additional projects until a new 
agreement is established for a new project will place the hired party in a 
strong position to argue that she is an independent contractor. 
 Of course, negotiating these terms may heavily depend on 
bargaining power.  A weak hired party may not be able to demand that no 
additional projects be assigned.  Likewise, a weak hiring party may not be 
able to insist that the hired party work on the hiring party’s premises.  But 
knowing where the various factors lie on the continuum may help the 
attorney for the weaker party focus on specific factors that the stronger 
party may be willing to budge on.  If choosing between asking the stronger 
party to capitulate with respect to a provision about where the hired party 
will physically work and a provision concerning the hours of the day the 
hired party must work, the attorney for the weaker party should focus 
negotiation efforts on the working hours provision because it is more 
important than the work location factor. 
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 Drawing a distinction between employees and independent 
contractors in the work made for hire doctrine is a challenging endeavor, 
but one that strikes at the heart of many copyright disputes.  After a quarter 
century of cases applying and interpreting the Supreme Court’s multifactor 
test from CCNV v. Reid, this Article gives the first comprehensive study of 
this multifactor test and answers the question of which factors are the most 
and least important in these analyses.  Some of the results are surprising 
while other results are expected.  But regardless of how these results 
conform to our expectations, they will prove useful to the bench and bar 
involved in copyright litigation and for business planning attorneys advising 
their clients how to accomplish their copyright ownership goals. 
